NATI ONL t SECURITY* POLICY23


  Nothing 'wewould do for, our Allie's would so raise their morale:, so
  stimulate their will to fight, as to place in their hands ample weapons
  with which to stop the tank.
    This opportunity to defeat-armor is the focus, but it does not stand
 alone. For an army to fight and hold lines it must defend itself against
 the low-flying aircraft carrying mochine guns for strafing and rockets
 for penetration. Thereaure also promising new weapons against these.
 It must defend its ports and its depots against the bomber. There
 are under :development devices, such as new antiaircraft guns and
 rockets, and ground to air missiles, which can impose 50% attrition
 on any high-flying bombers ,that attack such a strong point, and with
 .concentration and effort more, attrition even than this'. There aare anti-
 tank mines, and there can be new means of laying them rapidly. There
 must be tactical air, and this has been discussed.
   By vigorous action now we can, in time, place"Europe in the posi-
 lion where it, alone, couldhold off the Russian hordes until we could
 arrive in force. When that day comes we"will live in, a different sort
 of world.
   This discussion would be incomplete if I did not write&of costs. On
 ,everything' Ihave written I have had in mind primarily a change in
 temphasis raither than new additions to effort. With the amount we
 are putting into national defense, with all of it including our aid to
 ,allies of one form or another, much can be accomplished, very much
 if we merely realign our sights. Can all that I have outlined be thus
 accomplished1? I do not know. This requires a full examination of
 where we can safely retract as well as where we must add.-I do know
 that I would sacrifice some conventional things to the ends I'have in
 mind if this were necessary and I believe some ofsthiS is necessary and
 ,should be done." Beyondi this if necessary I would go farther. The
 American people are willing :to pay taxes, they are willing to forego
 more pleasant-things if necessary, for real defense, if convinced the
 money is well spent. If necessary to accomplish the end of placing
 ourselves in sound military condition I would increase the national
 expendiiture for military purposes. But certainly most of what I here
 consider involves a change of emphasis rather than merely more
 money, and to that extent it is now possible if we have the will and
 agility to meet the issue, quite apart from the profound question"of
 how much of" our national income .we can spend on military matters
 without wrecking the national economy.
 The primary desideration is that we should think fearlessly, with-
out prejudice "or false service interests, that we should face tough
facts, and that we should act. We have theorganizational machinery
for all this, if it- will function with sufficient vigor, and if it is allowed
to do so. We need to get up to date, and to tackle our really central


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