NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


       (6) the necessity for moving ahead as rapidly as possible with
    U.S. and European rearmament;
       (7) procedure for dealing with raw materials problems;
       (8) recognition that the major threat is the U.S.S.R.;
       (9) recognition that the threat from this quarter may be more
    immediate than we had previously thought.
  b. Stressing that apart from our differing views on seating the
Chinese communists in the U.N. and on the desirability of limited war-
fare against the Chinese communists, differences between the U.K.
and the U.S. positions were largely ones of emphasis.
  c. Concluding with emphasis on the importance of maintaining
solidarity with the U.K. because of two considerations:
       (1) geographic position and substantial real strength which
    the U.K. can contribute to our own defense;
       (2) the influence of the U.K. with the other Commonwealth
    countries and the rest of the free world generally.
  3. The President might then bring up item 2 of the agenda-the
situation we now face-and do the following in order:
  a. Call onk General Bradley for a brief comment on the military
situation in Korea.
  b. Call on General Smith for a summary appreciation of Soviet
intentions, objectives, and probable moves, and the probable immi-
nence of these moves.
  c. Ask Secretary Acheson to give any additional comments he might
like to make.
  d. Ask General Bradley to comment on our military position vis-a-
vis the U.S.S.R., this comment to include:
       (1) probable developments during the initial stages were gen-
    eral war to occur in the near future;
       (2) an estimate of the time which would be necessary for an
    improvement in our general military position vis-a-vis the
    U.S.S.R.
  4. 'The President might then take up ,the third item of the (agenda-
the steps we should take-calling first on Secretary Acheson for an
over-all presentation.
  5. In making his comments the Secretary might begin with 'a sum-
mary of the preceding discussion of Soviet intention, objectives, and
probable moves. ('The substance of this discussion might be antici-
pated to be as given in paragraph 9 of NIE, No. 11, December 5,
1950: 2 "The Soviet rulers have resolved oo pursue aggressively their
world-wide atttack on the power position of the United States and its
allies regardless of the possibility that global war may result, al-

  'For text of NIE 11, December 5, "Soviet Intentions in the Current
Situation,"
printed as a memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, December 2, see
vol. VIi, p. 1308.


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