.NATIONALW SECURITY POLICY- 5.....


pose, -the excess of. faith becoming prejudice, the excess. of tolerance
degenerating into indulgence of conspiracy and the excess-of resorting
to suppression when more moderate measures are not only more
appropriate 'but more effective.
   In copingwith dictatorial governments acting in secrecy and with
speed, we are also vulnerýble in that the democratic process-necessarily
operates in the open and at a 'deliberate tempo. Weaknesses in our
situattion are readily apparent andsubject to immediate exploitation.
This Government therefore cannot afford in the face of the totalitarian
challengetoooperate on a narrow' margin of strength. A democracy
can compensate for its natural vulnerability only if it maintains clearly
superior overall power in its most inclusive sense.
   The very-virtues of our system likewise handicap us in certain
respects in-our relations with our allies. While it is a general source of
strength to us that our relations with our allies are conducted on a
basis of persuasion 'and consent rather than compulsion and capitula-
tion, it is also evident that dissent among us can become a vulnerability.
Sometimes the dissent has its principal roots abroad in situations about
which we can do nothing. Sometimes it arises largely Out of certain
weaknesses Within ourselves, about which we can do Something-our
native impetuosity and a tendency to expect too much from people
widely divergentfrom us.&
  The full*capabilities of-the rest of the free woild a re a potential
increment to our own capabilities. It- may even"be said thatýthe
capa-
billties of: the! Soviet world, specifically the capabilities-of the nasses
who have nothing-to lose but their Soviet chains, are a potential which
can be enlisted on our side.
  Like our own capabilities, those of the rest of the free world exceed
the capabilities of the Soviet system. Like our own they are far from
being effectively mobilized and employed in the struggle against the
Kremlin design. This is so because the rest of the free world lacks a
sense of unity, confidence and common purpose. This is true in even the
most homogeneous and advanced segment of the free world-Western
Europe.
  As we ourselves demonstrate power, confidence and a sense of moral
and political direction, so those same qualities will be evoked in
Western Europe. In such a situation, we may also anticipate a general
improvement in the political tone in Latin America, Asia and Africa
and the real beginnings of awakening among the Soviet totalitariat.
  In the absence of affirmative decision on our part, the rest of the
free world is almost certain to become demoralized. Our friends will
become more than a liability to us; they can eventually become a posi-
tive increment to Soviet power.
  In sum, the capabilities of our allies are, in an important sense, a
function of our own. An affirmative decision to summon up the poten-


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