NATIONAL SECURITY. POLICY


necessary, and (b) to raise and maintain the forces which they must
provide.
   9. It should be specifically noted that the phasing of the MDAP is
 on an entirely different basis than that of the U.S. military programs-
 the former being timed, in accordance with the assumptions of the
 North Atlantic Treaty Defense Plan, to provide forces adequate for
 the defense of the North Atlantic area by 1954, whereas the target
 of the latter is to obtain the required U.S. forces as rapidly as prac-
 ticable. Since the factors which governed the selection of the earlier
 date in the case of U.S. programs have equal applicability to North
 Atlantic defense measures,-it is of the greatest importance that the
 phasing of the latter should, to the maximum degree possible, be
 brought into consonance with the phasing of U.S. programs. There-
 fore, every method should immediately be explored, and thereafter
 continue periodically to be explored, for accelerating, if possible to
 1952, the completion date of the program envisaged in current North
 Atlantic Treaty defense plans, including, but not limited to, considera-
 tion of (a) additional measures directed toward encouraging, per-
 suading and enabling other North Atlantic Treaty nations to increase
 and speed up their contributions; (b) new methods for accelerating
 the work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; (c) the possi-
 bility of setting earlier production targets for MDAP armaments to
 be produced in the United States; and (d) the possibility of the United
 States assuming a substantially greater proportion than presently
 proposed of the actual task of physically producing the capital and
 replacement requirements of the forces to be raised. To the extent that
 such acceleration can be achieved, the amounts of U.S. aid required
 will tend to be telescoped even more sharply in the earlier years and
 will also be increased in the aggregate. Even in the absence of any
 such acceleration, the further refinement of NATO defense plans
 and their firm pricing on an international basis may indicate a U.S.
 aid requirement appreciably larger than that now proposed.
 10. In the event that the number of nations receiving assistance is
 increased or in -the event of a major change in current military assist-
 ance objectives with respect to present aid recipients in the Middle
 or Far East, as, for example, in the case of Formosa or Indochina,
 MDAP figures would have to be reviewed.
 11. Our objective in providing economic aid outside the NATO
 areas is to create situations of political land economic strength in the
 free world especially in critical areas whose present weakness may in-
 vite Soviet thrusts. However, as a consequence of increased demands on
U.S. resources resulting from the military defense program, claims


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