NATIONAL SISECURITY POLICY


   It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy that we possess
 superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combination
 with other like-minded nations. One of the most important ingredients
 of power is military strength. In the concept of "containment",
the
 maintenance of a strong military posture is deemed to be essential
 for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate guarantee of our national security
 and (2) as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the, policy of
 "containment". Without superior aggregate -military strength,
in being
 and readily mobilizable, a policy of "containment'"-which is in
effect
 a policy of calculated and gradual coercion-is no more than a policy
 of bluff.
   At the same time, it is essential to the successful conduct of a policy
 of "containment" that we always leave open the possibility of
nego-
 tiation with the U.S.S.R. A diplomatic freeze-and we are in one
 now--tends to defeat the very purposes of "containment" because
it
 raises tensions at the same time that it makes Soviet retractions and
 adjustments in the direction of moderated behavior more difficult. It;
 also tends to inhibit our initiative and deprives us of opportunities
 for maintaining a moral ascendency in our struggle with the Sov;,,t
 system.
   In "co)ntainment" it is desirable to exert pressure in a fashion
which
will avoid so far as possible directly challenging Soviet prestige, to
keep open the possibility for the U.S.S.R. to retreat before pressvre
with a minimum loss of face and to secure political advantage from
the failure of the Kremlin to yield or take advantage of the openive
we leave it.

  We have failed to implement adequately these two fundamental
aspects of "containment". In the face of obviously mounting Soviet
military strength ours has declined relatively. Partly as a byproduct
of this, but also for other reasons, we now find ourselves at a diplo-
matic impasse with the Soviet Union, with the Kremlin growing
bolder, with both of us holding on grimly to what we have and with
ourselves facing difficult decisions.
  In examining our capabilities it is relevant to ask at the outset-'.
capabilities for what? The answer cannot be stated solely in the nega-
tive terms of resisting the Kremlin design. It includes also our capa-
bilities to attain the fundamental purpose of the United States, and
to foster a world environment in which our free society can survive
and flourish.
  Potentially we have these capabilities. We know we have them in
the economic and military fields. Potentially we also have them in the
political and psychological fields. The vast majority of Americans are
confident that the system of values which animates our societyý-the
principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance of the individual and


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