REGULATION! OF ARMAMENTS


consumed in atomic explosions for peaceful purposes or for tests.
Methods for detecting atomic explosions would provide a check on such
claims, although the quantities of fissionable material used might be
difficult to determine in some cases.
   With all the controls and inspections contemplated underthe United
 Nations plan, it would appear that quantitative information could be
 obtained about the total amount of fissionable material produced in
 the past. There is still the question of whether such information could
 be made sufficientlyy accurate. The Second Report of the United Na-
 tions Atomic Energy Commission defines dangerous activities or facili-
 ties as those "which are of military significance in the production
of
 atomic weapons," but does not give a quantitative meaning to "mili-
 tary significance," leaving this to the international agency to decide.
 Volume VI of "Scientific Information Transmitted to the United
 Nations Atomic Energy Commission by the United States Repre-
 sentative" includes the following statement:
   "It is difficult to define the amount of activity in the illicit
produc-
 tion of atomic weapons 1which is significant. The illicit construction of
 a single atomic bomb by means of a decade of successful evasion would
 not provide an overwhelming advantage, if it can be assumed that
 it would ,take -another decade to produce a second bomb. But the secret
 production of one bomb per year would create a definite danger, and
 the secret production of five or more per year would be disastrous.
 This report assumes arbitrarily that the minimum unit of noncompli-
 ance is the secret production of one ,atomic bomb per year or of a total
 of five bombs over any period of time."         -
   This statement was made at a time when atomic bombswere much
 scarcer than they are now. As the stocks of fissionable material ac-
 cumulate in various countries, the" difficulties whichftheintrnational
 agency would encounter in detecting th e withholding of fissionable
 material for a few bombs become greater. At the same time, weapon
 development is increasing the energy release which can be obtained
 from a given quantity of fissionable material, a trend which may reach
 its culmination in thermonuclear weapons.-
   These considerations emphasize theimportance- of two aspects of
the United Nations plan which were never worked out in detail, the
stages of transition to full control and the strategic distribution of
fissionable material. Before the crucial stage of turning over fission-
able material to the international agency was reached, each country
would have to assure itself that no other country was withholding
significant quantities of fissionable material. Since there will always
be the possibility of error or inaccuracy in this determination, the
strategic distribution of the bulk of the fissionable material might
have to be made in such a way as to override the effects of possible
withholding by one or more countries.


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