NATIONAL- SECURITY POLICY


  national economic equilibrium. This is a very important project and
  work on it should have a high priority. However, unless such an eco-
  nomic program is matched and supplemented by an equally far-sighted
  and vigorous political and military program, we will not be successful
  in checking and rolling back the Kremlin's drive.
    4. Negotiation. In short, by continuing along its present course the
  free world will not succeed in making effective use of its vastly
  superior political, economic, and military potential to build a tolerable
  state of order among nations. On the contrary, the political, economic,
  and military situation of the free world is already unsatisfactory
  and will become less favorable unless we act to reverse present trends.
  This situation is one which militates against successful negotiations
  with the Kremlin- :for the terms of agreements on important pending
  issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be un-
  acceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the
  free world. Unless a decision had been made and action undertakenA
  to buildup the strength, in the broadest sense, of ,the United States
  and the free world, an attempt to negotiate a general settlement on
  terms acceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long drawn
  out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary measures to
  build up our strength.
  This .is true despite the fact that the United States now has the
  capability of delivering a powerful blow against the Sov, iet Union in
  the event of war, for one of the present realities is that the United
  States is not-prepared to threaten the use of our present atomic,
  superiority to coerce the Sovi*et Union into acceptable agreements. In
  light of present trends, the Soviet Uniion will not withdraw and the
  only conceivable basis for a general settlement would be spheres of
  influence and of no influence--a "settlement" which the Kremlin
  could readily exploit to its great.advantage. The idea that Germany
  or Japan or other important areas can exist as islands of neUtrality in
  a divided world is unreal, given the Kremlin design for world.
  domination.
  B. The Second Course-Isolation.
  Continuation of present trends, it has been shown above, will lead
  progressively to the withdrawal of the United States from most of its
present commitments in Europe and Asia and to our ,isolation in the
Western Hemisphere and its approaches. This would result not from
a conscious decision but from a failure to take the actions necessary
to bring our capabilities into line with our commitments and thus to
a withdrawal under pressure. This pressure might come from our
present Allies, who will tend to seek other "solutions" unless
th~ey have
-confidence. in our :determination to acceleratel our efforts to. build a


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