504            FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I

with the enclosures thereto. They note that these enclosures include
a report prepared by the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic
Energy Commission at its 18th meeting in which its position regard-
ing the development, production, and use of the thermonuclear
(Super) weapon was set forth. In addition, they have noted the views
of the individual members of the General Advisory Committee as
expressed in their letters in the Annexes to the subject report.5 The
Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that other agencies of the Depart-
ment of Defense have been asked to comment on this matter.
  The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the interest of clarity and conciseness,
have consolidated the major points raised in the subject report and
in the letters by the members of the General Advisory Committee into
five categories, namely, General, Military Value, Diplomatic Value,
Psychological Value, and Moral Value, and have made their com-
ments responsive to the following interrogatories which comprise the
points raised under each category. In this connection, it should be
pointed out that the tenor and the emphasis of the questions are
such as to assume public knowledge of the development of the super
bomb by the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their
view that "any decisions or actions pertaining to the United States'
effort to develop a thermonuclear weapon or any determination of its
feasibility constitute a military secret of highest classification".*
a. General.
   Question: Is it necessary now to launch a "crash" program for
the
development of a super bomb?
  Com4wnt: The Joint Chiefs of Staff at this time believe that it
is not necessary to launch a "crash" program. However, they consider
the following program to be the minimum effort which should be
undertaken at this time:
   (1) The determination of the technical feasibility of a thermonu-
clear explosion as a matter of top priority.
   (2) Studies of the necessary delivery vehicle and ordnance problems
should proceed concurrently with 1 (1) above and should not necessarily
await trial of'a thermonuclear assembly.

  5The report of the General Advisory Committee, October 30, 1949, is not
printed. Its first part urged increased production of fissionable material.
The
second part recommended against the high-priority development of thermo-
nuclear weapons. For texts of the letter from Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer,
Chair-
man of the General Advisory Committee, transmitting the report to the Chairman
of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, October 30, 1949, and two letters express-
ing the views of individual members of the GAC (annexes to the report), see
Foreign Relationg, 1949, vol. I, p. 569. The GAC report is further described
in
Hewlett and Duncan, pp. 883-385.
  *Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated 23 November 1949, subject:
  "The United States Military Position with Respect to the Development
of the
  Thermonuclear Weapon." [Footnote in the source text. For text, see
ibid., p. 595.]