NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


the probability that the Soviet may have to fight on two fronts
simultaneously.
  23. Considerable numbers of Japanese prisoners remain under So-
viet control and constitute a potential for infiltration of Japan should
conditions in that country invite such action. The diversion of U.S.
occupation forces from Japan to Korea, the lack of Japanese defense
forces, and the inadequacy of Japanese police, present a dangerous
situation which must be kept under review.
Probable Non-Military Moves by the USSR
  24. The USSR will undoubtedly direct communist parties and
stooge groups abroad to embarrass us in every conceivable way. In-
tensified communist subversive or revolutionary activity might fully
engage local military resources throughout Asia, as well as involve
additional United States and allied military resources.
  25. The following examples will provide cases in point. Current
conditions in Iran, though improving, still provide wide opportuni-
ties for subversive and communist infiltration, particularly for at-
tempted seizure of the government by the communist-dominated
Tudeh Party. In addition, guerrilla operations fostered by the Soviets
might be successful in Azerbaijan. The testing of our firmness in
other areas may take every form known to communist ingenuity.
Provocations and annoyances may occur, even up to and including-
an attempt to reimpose the Berlin blockade or to blockade Vienna. If
any weakness or hesitation on the part of the United States is en--
countered anywhere it will be instantaneously exploited by the com-
munists to undermine confidence in and support of the United Statesa
everywhere.
  26. In addition, the USSR may well seek to create division in the,
UN membership with respect to the police action in Korea by playing
upon hopes of a peaceful settlement, creating the impression that
major concessions to the UN position may be forthcoming, or even
by offering such concessions in a context in which the USSR would
gain substantial though perhaps not immediately obvious advantages
if such a settlement were made. If the UN forces were to be dislodged
from the peninsula the theme of accepting a fait accompli would cer-
tainly be played for all it is worth. It is also to be anticipated that
the USSR will make every effort to exploit the division between the
United States and other non-communist powers on the issue of For-
mosa. In general there will also no doubt be a continuance of the peace
offensive designed both to divide the U.S. and its allies and to create
in the latter domestic division between elements determined to resist
Soviet aggression and elements which lack such determination. The


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