W2 FOREIGN “RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I

mternational control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would
_-have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of
accommodation and compromise before such an arrangement would
be conceivable. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of
the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Coun-
cil, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated that *. ‘.. . the majority of the
Commission has been unable to secure . their acceptance of the
nature and extent of participation’ in the world community required
of all nations in this field... . As a result, the Commission has been
forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the con-
trol of atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation. in broader
fields of policy.’

“Tn short, itis. impossible to hope that an effective plan for inter-
national control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin design
has been. frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic c change
in Soviet policies has taken place.” | |

- The narrower but important question of the current technical ade-
quacy of the UN plan:was raised during this study. On April 20, 1950,
a letter, over your signature, was sent to the AEC, requesting a cur-
rent evaluation, without regard | ‘to ‘Political ‘Issues, of the UN plan
(see Tab B)& 7

The AEC replied on June 26, 1950, Ina letter that was obscure and
hardly responsive (see Tab C).* An extreme conclusion that might be
drawn from it was that we should no longer support the UN plan.
This letter was the subject of my memorandum to you dated August 14,
1950 (see Tab D),° accompanied by.a letter to the AEC for your sig-
nature, requesting further information and a more precise expression
of views. This letter was signed on August 22, 1950 (see Tab K).° |
_ The AKC replied to this last letter on September 20, 1950 (see Tab
*) “and came to the following conclusions:

“qa. Effective. international. control of atomic. energy on a current
and continuing basis after the United Nations plan went into full
operation would be technologically feasible.

“0. The detection of the withholding of fissionable material pro-
duced prior to the implementation of the United Nations plan would
be more difficult, and the amount of fissionable material which might
be withheld without detection would increase as the accumulation of
fissionable material increases. This difficulty stresses the need for
(1) stages of transition to full control of such a nature as to provide
opportunities for obtaining assurances against the withholding of
significant quantities of fissionable material and @) strategic distri-

* Ante, p. 66.
. *Ante, p. 79.
5 Not printed.
* Ante, p. 82.
T Ante, p. 94.