FOREIGN RELATIONS'-)"1950, VOLUME I


materials and international ownership and operation of dangerous
facilities, coupled with inspection based on continuous unlimited free-
dom of access to all parts of the Soviet Union (as well as to all parts
of the territory of other signatories to-the control agreement) appear
to be necessary -to give the requisite degree of assurance against secret
violations. As the Soviet stockpile of fissionable materials grows,
the amount which the U.S.S.R. might secretly withhold and not declare
to the inspection agency grows. In this sense, the earlier an agreement
is consummated the greater the security it would offer. The possibility
of successful secret production operations also increases with develop-
ments which may reduce the size and power consumption of individual
reactors. The development of a thermonuclear bomb would increase
many fold the damage a given amount of fissionable material could
do and would,- therefore, vastly increase the danger that a decisive
advantage could be gained through secret operations.
  5. The relative sacrifices which would be involved in international
control need also to be considered. If it were possible to negotiate an
effective system of international control the United States would
presumably sacrifice a much larger stockpile- of atomic: weapons and
a much larger production capacity than would the U.S.S.R. The open-
ing up of national territory to international inspection involved in an
adequate control and inspection system would have a: far greater
impact on the U.S.S.R. than on the United States. If the control system,
involves the destruction of all- large reactors and thus a moratorium on
certain possible peacetime uses, the U.S.SR., can be expected&to argue
that it, because of- greater need -for new sources of energy, would be,
making a greater sacrifice in this regard than the United States.
  6. The United States and the peoples of the worldas a whole desire
a respite from the dangers of atomic warfare. The chief difficulty lies
in the danger that the respite would be short and that we might not
have adequate notice of its pending termination. For such-an arrange-
ment to be in the interest of the United States, it is ;essential that, the
agreement be entered into in good faith by both sides and the
probability against its violation high-.
  7. The most substantial contribution to security of an effective
international control system would, of course, be the opening up of
the Soviet Union, as required under the U.N. plan. Such openingup
is not, however,- compatible with the-maintenance of the Soviet system
in its present rigor. This is a major reason for the Soviet refusal
to accept the U.N. plan..
  The studies which began with the Acheson-Lilienthal committee
and culminated in the present U.N. plan made it clear that inspection
of atomic facilities would not alone give the assurance of control; but
that ownership and operation by an international authority of the


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