23&FOREIGN RELATIONS)- 1950, vo~ttME I


  VIII. Atomic* Armaments...............                    ...7
          A. Military Evaluation of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Atomic
            Cap abilitie's ..............
         B. Stockpiling andUse of Atomic Weapons     .        38
         C. International Control'of AtomicEonegy, ..     40
   IX. Possible Courses of Action.     ..... ...   ......     44
         Introduction....     ......W.............-......44
         The Role of Negotiation;...............      ... 44
            A. The-First Course-Continuation of Current-Pol-
              icies, with Currenturre Currently Projected
              Programs for Carrying Out-These Projects        48
            B.. .The Second Course--Isolation., ..* ..     .... 51
            -C. The Third Course-"War..........      ....     52
            D. The Remaing ..Coiurse     f fAction-a Rapid
              Build-up of Political, Economic, and Military
              Strength in the Free World................54
Conclusions......     ...... ....................      ...    60
Recommendations . ...        ...      .     ....      .....66
                      TERMS OF REFERENCE
  The following report is submitted in response to the President's
directive of January 31 which reads:
  "That -the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense to-oundertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace
and -war and of.theeffectof' these objectives on our strategic-plans, in
the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermo-
nuclear bombcapabiity of the Soviet Union."
   The document which recommended, that such a directive-be, issued8
 reads. in part:.
   "It must be considered whether a decision to proceed w ithta program
 directed towarddetermining feasibility prejudges themore funda-
 mental decisions (a) as ito whether, in the event that-a test of -a thermo-
 nuclear .weapon proves successful, such weapons should- be stockpiled,
 or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under twhich they might be used in
 war. If .a test of a thermonuclear weapon _proves successful, the pres-
 sures to produce andstockpile such weapons 'to be held for the same
 purposes for which fission boombs are then being held will be greatly
 increased. 'The question of use-policy-can 'be ,adequately ,assessed only
 ws a part of ,a general reexamination of this country's-strategic plans
 and its objectives in peace 'and war. 'Such reexamination would need to
   I Reference Is to the-Report by the- Special Committee Of the National
Security
 Council:to6 President Truman on the Development of Thermonuclear Weapons,
 January 31,.1950; for text, see.p..513.


236