ATOMIC ENERGY


                         R-ECOM C MEN DATION S
  11. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the following
recommendations are made:
  a. That the President direct the Atomic Energy Commission to
proceed to determine the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear
weapon, the scale and rate of effort to be determined jointly by the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense; and that
the necessary ordnance developments and carrier program be under-
taken concurrently;
  b. That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secre-
tary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in
peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic
plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible
thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union; 4
  c. That the President indicate publicly the intention of this Govern-
ment to continue work to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear
weapon, and that no further official information on it be made public
without the approval of the President.
   [Here follow Appendix A, a historical statement, and Appendix B,
a stuaff study, prepared by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.]

                            Appendix "C"
     THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS5

                           THE PROBLEM
   1. To determine the military implications of weapons employing
thermonuclear reactions in deuterium and tritiunm to obtain energy
releases in the order of millions of tons of TNT.
                            ASSUMPTIONS
  2. That it is within the capabilities of the United States from the
standpoint of money, materials and industrial effort to develop for
test of feasibility a prototype thermonuclear weapon.
   3. If the thermonuclear reaction of light elements were proved
 feasible of attainment, that it would be within the capabilities of the
 United States to produce these weapons in limited quantities.
 4. That no practical factors are known to exist which conclusively
 eliminate the possibility or probability of Soviet development of a
 thermonuclear weapon in minimum quantities.

 "Interdepartmental efforts pursuant to this recommendation resulted
in the
 preparation of NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National
 Security," a report to the President, April 7, 1950. For the text of
NSC 68 and
 related documentation, see pp. 234 ff.
 Preparedby the Department of Defense.
      496-162-77----A-4


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