FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


   We certainly do not advocate sweeping and empty announcements
 for their propaganda impact alone. But we do feel that if there is ever
 -a time ,when psychological factors are enormously important, that
 time is now. Moreover, we know we are bound to embark on a huge
 mobilization program; hence it should be quite possible to use that
 fact in a way that will meet the psychological crisis we face. If we
 move now in this direction, there is a good chance that we can enlist
 the support of that large segment of the public opinion, here and
 abroad, that is now in a highly fluid state. If we wait until appropriate
 officials have worked out every last detail of the things that are going
 to be done, we very likely will have lost the support of public opinion.
 We will seem to be trailing badly.
   Accordingly, it is recommended that the President ,assert his leader-
 ship promptly. He could do this in a message to Congress,:;in a simple
 announcement from the White House, or, preferably, in a fireside
 talk, within the next two days. The content of that message or talk
 should be along the following lines:
   (1) An analysis of ,the situation we face and the gravity of it
 (coupled with whatever grave announcement it may at that time
 be appropriate to make regarding Korea).
   (2) A brief statement of the world situation we face, based on the
concept of NSC,-68,
   (3) A clear 'and forceful statement to the effect that we lare calm
and resolute, determined to meet the grave world situation, but also
determined not to be rushed into any shortsighted or unwise inter-
national moves.
   (4) A statement, that the President is today declaring a state of
national emergency.
   (5) A statement that, in the interest of building.upthe -forces to
preserve the peace, he is today instructing the appropriate authorities
to double the previously planned rate of acceleration of production of
Army equipment and Air Force equipment. (This might mean revis-
ang schedulks sothat by December, 1951, we reach the level of produc-
tion previously planne d for December, 1952.)
   (6) Announcing simply that the President is instructing the Navy
to enlist ;as rapidly 'as possible the manpower needed to man 75% (or
another 'appropriate figure) of the usable Navy vessels. now  in
mothballs.
  (7) Announcing that he is-instructing the. control 'agencies of
Government to draft and issue whatever regula-tions are necessary to
facilitate this program, preparing requests for legislation where that
is necessary.
  (8) Announcing that, at his reques t, he Joint Chiefs of Staff (or
SecDef) are bringing General Eisenhower back into 'active service
wi'th the assignment of going to Europe, :as representative of the


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