Assembly-3a in which, among other things, they outlined the basic ob-
stacks to agreement, ,and stated certain cnclusion which I believe
are sufficiently important Ito read to you now:"
  "It appears from these consulations that, as in the ,past, the Soviet
Union will not negotiate except on the basis of the principles set forth
in the Soviet proposals of June 1947..
  "The essential points in the Soviet control proposals, 'and the rea-
  The ... ssentia...                  ..le   asorontsou inth
sons for their rejection by the other five Powers as brought out in the
consultations,-are as follows:
       ,The Soviet Union proposes that nations should continue to
     own explosive atomi materials.

           "The other five Powers feel that under such conditions
        there would be no effective protection against the sudden use
        of these materials as atomic weapons.
        "The Soviet Union proposes that nations continue, as at present,
    to own, operate, and-manage facilities making or using dangerous
    quantities of such materials.
           "The other five Powers believe that under such conditions,
         it would be impossible .to detect or prevent the diversion of
         such materials for use in atomic weapons.
       "The Soviet Union proposes a system of control depending on
     periodic inspection of facilities, the existence of ,which the national
     government concerned reportsto the internationali agency, supple-
     meoted by special investigations on suspicion of 'treaty Violations.
           "The-other five-Powers 'believe that. periodic inspection
         -would not prevent -the diversion of dangerous materials and
         that the specia investigations envisaged would bewholly in-
         sufficient to prevent clandestine activities.
   "COther points_-of difference, -including Soviet insistence on the
right
 ,to veto the recmmenda~ions of the International Control Agency,
 have not yet 'been discussed in .the consultations.
   "Theseconsultations have not yetYsucceeded in bringing about-agree-
 ment between the U.S.S.R. and the other five Powers, but they have
 served -to clarify some of the 'points on which there is disagreement.
   "It is apparent that there is a, fundamental difference not only
on
 methods but also on aims. All of the Sponsoring Powers other than
 the U.S.S.R. put world security first and are prepared to accept iuno-

   3For the full text of the Interim Report and the Five-Power statement
of
 October 25, 1949, see United Nations official Records of the.General Assembly,
 Fourth Session, Supplement Nlo. 15, "International Control of Atomic
Energy"
 (hereafter cited as GA (IV) SupPlement No. 15), pp. 3&-37, or Department
of
 State, Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959 (Washington: Government Print-
 ing Office, 1960), vol. I, pp. 216-225.
   For text of the proposals submitted by Soviet Representative Andrei A.
   Gromyko, June 11, 1947, see United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic
   Energy Commission, Second Year, Plenary Meetings (hereafter cited as AEC,
   2nd yr., P-lenary), pp. 20-24, or :Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959,
vol I,
   pp. 85-88. For documentation on the Soviet proposals, see Foreign :Relations,
1947,
   vol. I, pp. 327 if.


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