00             FOREQX. ELT;ON$1S, j95,02 YQILjME I

   The assumption that Soviet views ruin this direction is orne out
 by the tenor of Soviet propaganda in recent weeks. The Tass corm-
 niuniqu6 issued in connection with the U.S. annoITzacement about the
 atomic expiosioi in Russia, whijeq not specificlly claiming that atomic
 energy was already being used for peaceful purposes, obviovsly aimed
 to leave such an implication: in the mind of the reader by talkng
 about "   . onstriuction work of great scale , . necessitating great
 explosive work with application newest technical means..
   Vyshinski, in his speech before the Unitd Nations o4n November 10,
 1949, said:
        - thee greatn iventions ought to be utilized in order t+ raise the
economic, social and cultural level of mankind, t raise oe r level- of
progress and to expedite our progress. The role of atomc energy in
economic and social development is tremendous, we cannot exaggerate
it. And this makes it quite clear how evil, how sorrowful, it would be
if this question were taken away from the control of sovereign, peace-;
loving statres. , ' .
  Atomic energy, he said, "is assigned an exceptional economic, social
  and cultural significance" in the national economy of the Soviet Union.
He criticized the present U.N. plan as one the implications of which
"would make it impossible to use atomic energy for peacefut purposes
at all". All these statements indicate that there will be vigorous Soviet
resistance to the suggestion that large reactors be banned.
  And we should expect -to encounter similar resistance from the
British and perhaps from other governments as well.
                               'II
  The problem whether it is desirable for this+ Government to move
now -as far as possible and as rapidly as possible toward international
Control is only part of a deper problem, involving certain very far-
reaching judgments and decisions of national policy, both foreign and
domestic. It is not the purpose, of this, paper to deal exhaustively with
this deeper problem or to make recommendations for- its solution. But
it:l is important, in any consideration of the international control prob-
lem, to. identify the larger problem of which it is a part, to see what
other, things ,are logically involved in it, an&dto note certain factors
bearing upon it which have particular importance from the standpoint
of international control.

  IMTeiegram 2406, September 25, 1949, from the American Embassy in- Moscow
to the Department of Statne [Footnote in the soiuce text. For text of telegram
under refe~rence, see Foreign R~elations,: 1949, vol. v, p. 656. J  ....
  *US/C/A.31/238, p. 18. [Footnote in the source :text. For the recor of
VYsbinaky's ad44tre.~at t~me. Sd Meeting +of+ the 44 +Ho +Poi~ticat Comittee,