7FOREIGN i RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


tion 'as a means of assuring its continued existence as a useful
international instrument.
   It is suggested that the proposals below should be placed on the
 agenda as a separate item. The occasion of the review of import re-
 strictions required by Article XIV (1),(g),3. which is already on the
 agenda, might conceivably be used as a springboard for implementing
 the recommendations of this paper;- but -the drawback in such an
 approach lies in the fact that the Article XIV review is limited to
 the discriminatorypaspect of import controls, rather than to their
 protective incidence as a whole.
   Insofar as it may be helpful to achieve the adoption of the proposals
 described below, the U.S., in informal discussions with the contracting
 parties which are also members of the OEEC, may refer to the report
 of the Central Group of the OEEC on import restrictions and to any
 other OEEC materials to which it might be politic to refer.
   The working party should recommend to the Contracting Parties the
 following specific propositions:
   (1) That the Contracting Parties condemn: the use of the quan-
 titative restrictions ostensibly imposed for balance-of-payments
 reasons as a means of achieving protectionist objectives, on the grounds
 that such misuse is inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT;=and
 that this condemnation-make reference to, but not-be limited to, such
 specific practices as it may be possible to reach agreement on in the
 working party (such as seasonal quotas and minimum import-price
 requirements).
   (2) That the Contracting Parties request member countries to
review their systems of import controls and their bilateral agreements
with a view to eliminating any such provisions.
   (3) That the Contracting Parties recommend to member coun-
tries which consider it necessary to enter into bilateral agreements as
a means of meeting their balance-of-payments difficulties, that they
should not place limitations on imports in such agreements but instead
should provide for consultation in the event unmanageable balances
develop; or, where this approach is not practicable because of; an
obviously unbalanced rellationship between two countries which the
debtor country could not finance, that import restrictions should not
be applied by such prospective creditor country, and should not be
applied by such debtor country except for the smallest practicable
number of products.
   (4) That the Contracting Parties also recommend to member coun-
tries which maintain import restrictions as a means of meeting their
balance-of-payments difficulties, that in general they confine their
specific limitations to the smallest possible number of products.
  (5) That the individual contracting parties be requested to submit
to the Contracting Parties by January 1, 1951, a report on the measures
taken pursuant to the resolutions set out above or, if no such measures

1 See p. 748.


710