155


NATIONAL SE;CURITY POLICY


    tion to cut their people off from representatives of the West,
    would permit agents of an internationalinstitution to move freely
    throughout the Soviet Union and to examine any mine, factory
    or laboratory they wish in order to determine whether or not
    atomic materials are present there. Yet such absolute freedom of
    movement and inspection would obviously be the minimum which
    the West could consider to be effective control of atomic energy.
    Agreement on this matter would therefore seem to be impossible
    until the Soviet leaders come to consider, which they obviously
    do not at present, that their security would be more seriously
    jeopardized by an absence of control of atomic energy than by the
    sort of effective control described above.
      B. Disarmament of Conventional Weapons. Discussion of
    this subject has made no progress whatsoever in the UN. Soviet
    proposals have been of a nature which, while reducing existing
    armaments across the board, would leave their substantial su-
    periority in most branches intact. It seems foolish to think that
    either they will agree to abandon this superiority or we will agree
    to sanction it unless and until a substantial measure of mutual
    confidence between East and West can be created. History has
    made abundantly clear that such confidence must pirecede
    disarmament.
      C. UN Security Forces. Really effective UN security forces
    would have to be strong enough and well enough equipped to
    cope with any potential aggressor, including the most powerful.
    They would therefore have, under present circumstances, to be
    equipped with atomic weapons and the Great Powers would be
    obliged to disarm substantially so that they would not be over-
    whelmingly superior to the UN forces. This statement makes it
    clear that there can be no real progress on the creation of effective
    UN forces until there has been progress on the control of atomic
    energy and on disarmament.
  2. North Atlantic Treaty and Military Aid Program. It is obvious
that one of the first Soviet demands in negotiations for a general set-
tlement would be for the ,dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty and
the abandonment of the Military Aid Program, which they claim
to be directed against them. It is obvious that we could not agree to
any such demand until there should have been a settlement of most of
the other points at issue between East and West, leading us to the
conclusion that the Soviet Union had abandoned her aggressive ob-
jectives and capabilities.
  3. European Recovery Program. The Soviet Union would also
presumably demand the abandonment of ERP, which she refused to
join and which she has always claimed is an instrument of American
imperialism. We clearly could not consent to abandon ERP until we
believed it had accomplished its objective of making Western
Europe economically capable of resisting Communist expansion and
infiltration.