FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


  Dr. 'Conant put great emphasis on the "1960 hope", as developed[
on page 3 of V(D). He raised the question whether that date might
be considerably advanced.
  Regarding the section on intelligence, Dr. Conant admitted that
he was wrong himself in his guess as to when theSoviet Union might
have the first bomb, his feeling being that they would have it some-
time between five and fifteen years after the war. He wondered
whether the estimates regarding the atomic and hydrogen bomto
potentialities might not be suffering from over-compensation. He
could not help but believe that the H-bomb capabilities were far too,
optimistic. He ended up by stating that he had strong reservations on
paragraph 7 and enormous reservations on paragraph 8 estimates.
  At the top of page 4, he believed that we had made the assumption
that we would not be doing much to oppose Soviet advances and sug-
gested that we might emphasize this point by introducing the para-
graph with "Depending on what we do, they might ....oi
  General Landon stated that the "1960 hope" was based on the present
program unaltered. Dr. Conant felt that this was very good because
this makes it more than a hope. We could do something to bring it
closer.
  In Section VII, Dr. Conant agreed that nobody can say that the
Soviet, Union won't strike now. He also lagreed that anything that we
do prior to 1960 may increasethe risk and that what we have here is
a series of calculated risks.
  Mr. Nitze stated theat if we do nothing, there are risks involved. If
we do something, the risks may increase. Dr. Conant agreed and stated
that decisions made now -for 1960 may increase the risksý in the interim
and emphasized that war in any form would jeopardize our objectives
and, furthermore, might bring about ,annihilation.
  Under Section VIII (B), Dr. Conant questioned the phrase "forces
required, for victory", since we have not yet indicated what victory
is.
If victory consists in liberating peoples in the satellite countries, that.
is one thing.
  Mr. Nitze pointed :out thlat we have :in mind the objectives in peace
and in war outlined previously. He further pointed out that we must
capitalize upon the desire of the Poles, etc. for liberation. A purely
defensive objective may deny us ,their assistance. Dr. Conant stated
that the long range Utopian objectives ,are ,in reality the cold war
objectives in time of 13eace and the war slogans in time of war. He
again argued for a 20-year conitainment on presentlines, withoutatar,
as a realistic objecive. -
  Dr. Conant again queried how ifar we should go in getting victory.
Should we crack the monolithic Communist party control? He did not


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