38FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


The Korean situation, to analyze and evaluate further possible short-
,range moves by the USSR. This is a short-term analysis which
ýattempts to scan only a period two or three months ahead, although
the long-range possibilities cannot be ignored.
   1. The opening of hostilities in Korea could conceivably mean that
 -the Kremlin intends to embark on any one or a combination of the
 following courses of action:
   a. To initiate global war.
   b. To employ Soviet forces, alone or with satellite forces, in iso-
 lated or piecemeal attacks against local and limited objectives, not
 designed to bring on global war.
   e. To inspire further aggression using only satellite forces, but not
 using USSR armed forces.
   d. To probe U.S. determination and military effectiveness.
 Po8sibility of Global War
   8. It has been our estimate that the Kremlin did not intend to
 engage in a major war and might be deterred from initiating such a
 war in the future if confronted with sufficient political, economic and
 military strength designed to force the retreat of Russian commu-
 nism. This estimate has not necessarily been invalidated by the events
 of the past few weeks, which are consistent with the following
 interpretation:
   a. In causing the attack to be launched in Korea, the Kremlin did
not intend to bring about a global war and did not expect, although
militarily prepared for, United States military involvement in Korea.
The probable aim of the Kremlin was simply to gain control of the
entire Korean peninsula and thus to strengthen materially its stra-
tegic position in Northern Asia with global political and military
results.
  b. The Kremlin seems to have calculated its moves with a view
to keeping the responsibility of the Soviet Government unengaged
and its own military forces uncommitted.
  9. On the other hand, the events of the past few weeks could be
interpreted as the first phase of a general Soviet plan for global war.
Should the Kremlin in fact be desirous of or reconciled to a global
war, of which the Korean situation is the first phase, the following
considerations might govern its actions in the near future:
  a. The Kremlin might be disposed to forego any action which it
calculated would provoke global war until such time as the United
States had reached the point of maximum diversion and attrition of
its forces-in-being without involvement of the military forces of the
Soviet Union, or until it had developed its atomic striking capabili-
ties to the point which it deemed desirable for a general attack on the
West. As long as we are being forced to commit ever greater incre-
ments of our forces-in-being in Korea, the Kremlin might not hasten


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