NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


be better off if we had one million more men under arms rather than
more air power. He thought we should put more stress on the defense
of the U.K. and consider stationing U.S. troops there.'
    General Landon said that we are forced to rely on all possible tech-
 nical supremacy in order to overcome superior manpower, He pointed
 out that the U.K. is more vulnerable to bombing attack than either the
 Soviet Union or the United States. Furthermore, we might not need
 the U.K. as an, ,advance base for 1960. At the present time, we can
 hurt the Soviet Union only by air power, and even 'in 1960 we can
 hold in Europe only with air support.
   It was agreed- that it was very desirable to advance the 1960 date
 by the training of either European or U.S. troops, or both.
   Dr. Conant wondered whether we-might seek agreement to prevent
 surprise attack by atomic weapons. Agreement on a fully effective
 plan is very remote. He wondered whether we might negotiate some
 scheme whereby we might get 30 days' warning and delay in launching
 an atomic blitz.
   General Burns asked whether enough bombs dropped on the Soviet
 Union would force them to surrender..Dr. Conant did not believe so.
 He questioned deliverability. There was some question. as to whether
 :any scheme could possibly give more than 24 hours of warning, -which
 might be of but little help. It was agreed that the United Kingdom
 was very vulnerable to an atomic blitz. Dr. Conant, however, could
 not see how either the Soviet Union or the United States could be
 blitzed into suing for peace. Both can perhaps be de-industrialized,
 but he wondered who was going to Sue whom for what. Mr. Nibze
 pointed out that the crucial point was control of the air.
   Dr. Conant felt that in order to end the cold war and with the ob-
 jective. of both holding Western Europe and avoiding a war before
 1980, we might take action insuring the following:
   1. More money for Marshall Plan aid
   2. More military assistance
   3. One million more men in the United Kingdom and in Europe
   4. Keeping the seas open, especially against submarines
   5. Building up defenses
   6., Not wasting our substance on too many new weapons
   7. Attempting negotiations on a new basis regarding conventional
 armaments and atomic weapons,.not on the theory that agreement will
-be reached, but thalt we would worry the other fellow and also help
push -the program of the United States.
   Regarding negotiations, he thought that a mistake had been made
 by, negotiating in the United Nations and emphasized the desirability
 of bilateral negotiations. He-pointed out that we cannot win by trading
 queens, ,and that by 1980 the Soviet Union may realize -this also.


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