FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


Chances are somewhat less than 50-50 that they will make the attempt
in the next six weeks (i.e., before the setting in of the southwest
monsoons). If the attempt is not made within this period it will prob-
ably not be made at all at the present juncture. Nothing that has yet
occurred gives us reason to believe (a) thiat the. Nationalists could not
hold the island with'what they now have if determined to do so and
well-led in the operation, or, on the other hand, (b)-that they would,
as things now stand actually, put up any appreciable resistance if
Chinese Communist forces were to land on the island in sizeable
strenth. (This is not to say they will not fight; it is merely to say
that nothing we now know gives us any assurance that they will.)
  11. With respect to Indo-lChina, the Chinese Communists are now
lending ofairly large-scale assistance in the training, and to some
extent the equipping, of new Viet Minh forces, who will presumably
be moved across the border in time to participate in the intensified
hostilities which are expected in the autumn of this year. There are
no indications as yet that the Chinese Communists have any inten-
tion of introducing their own forces into the Indo-Chinese guerrilla
war, and indeed this would raise delicate political problems for
Peiping and Moscow and the Viet Minh, if it were to occur. 'However,
there is fairly serious evidence that Chinese assistance short of this
may soon assume much more serious proportion and even involve
some show of Chinese force along the frontier.
  12. With respect to Iran, the war of nerves will be carried on
vigorously, possibly even to the point of a demand for Iranian assent
to the re-entry of Soviet troops into northern Iran on the basis of the
1921 agreement. If the Iranian Government stands firm, refuses to
give its assent, and makes it plain that tan entry of Soviet forces in
defiance of its wishes will be opposed by force of arms, it is not likely
that the move will-be attempted.
  13. In the Balkans, evidence as to Soviet intentions is inconclusive.
It is probable that at least until quite recently the Soviet leaders had
themselves not made up their minds what to -do in that area. An attack
against either Turkey or Greece is not a promising undertaking, from
their standpoint, 'as long as Tito remains recalcitrant and not mili-
tarily crushed. The position of Tito's Yugoslavia as an uncommitted,
unpredictable and possible hostile force on the flank of their Balkan
satellites would be uncomfortable for the Soviet leaders-in the event
of war ill Europe; and it is possible that, convinced of the likelihood
of an early outbreak of war, they consider it mandatory, as a measure
of military precaution, to eliminate the political resistance to their
power in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, any attempt along these lines,
whether launched exclusively with satellite forces or with Soviet
forces, or with both, involves formidable risks and disadvantages from


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