NATIONAL, SECURITY POLICY


     To sum up, I suggest that the recommendation be pointed up along
  the following lines:
     (1) The present and dangerous discrepancy between Soviet mili-
  tary power and that of the West cannot'be allowed to continue.
     (2) In order to avoid kicking off a full-scale rearmamentprogram
  -of the standard nature, with all the consequences, political and eco-
  nomic, which &that might involveo the .President-should-direct that
  maximum effort, includ ing the requisite funds, should be given to a
  program of research anddevelopment in modern weapons ýof war with
  a view to-overcoming this deficiency by quality rather than quantity.


  Policy Planning Staff Files
  Memora~ndum, b th e A siszstant Secretar of State for Public Afi.
                           Y.._                              A .-i.
                  (Barrett) to the Secretary of State"
 TOP SECRET                            [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1950.
 Subject: State-Defense Study-Group Papers
    I consider this a magnificent job of analyzing the problem. I have
  a number of minor suggestions regarding phraseology, ,which I either
  ,have passed along or am-passing along to Paul Nitze's staff.
  Regarding the organization of the paper, the real conclusions seem
  to me to be at the last of Section 9. If it is anticipated.that -some of
  those dealing with this, paper will have to read it rather hastily, I
  suggest that these should be more clearly labeled as the real conclu-
  sions, whether by putting them .at the end of the paper, or by referring
  to them more definitely and-precisely in Section 10.
  My most important.point: the whole paper seems to me to.point to
  a gigantic armament race, a huge. buildup of conventional arms that
  quickly become obsolescent, a greatly expanded military establishment
  in being. I think that, however much we whip up sentiment, we are
  going to run into vast opposition among informed people to a huge
  arms race. We will be warned that we are heading toward a "garrison
  state". Moreover, even if we should sell the idea, I fear that the
U.S.
  public would rapidly tire of such an effort. In the absence of real and
  continuing crises, a dictatorship can unquestion-ably out-ast a democ-
  racy in a conventional armament race.
  On the other hand, I believe the American public can be sold on
programs to build up our strength in those fields in which we have
natural superiority. These are:
  1. Economic and technical-as reflected in Point IV and a con-
tinuing ECA program;
  :'Transmitted through Under Secretary of State Webb.


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