FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


  Point (1) above is contemplated under any system of control so far
advanced and needs no further comment. Point (2) does not go far
enough in that it makes no provision for locating either unknown or
undeclared raw materials sources. The provision in Point (3) for
periodic observation over sites of dismantled or deactivated reactors
is either unnecessary if the reactors are completely removed, or insuffi-
cient if the reactors can in fact be reactivated 'without much difficulty.
Point (4) is provided for in the U.N. plan. Its requirement for com-
plete openness of national laboratories is not acceptable to theSoviet
Union. Point (5) may or may not be adequate, depending -on-the
nature of the so-called non-dangerous activity. In certain reactors,
which need not be very large, it is possible to conduct certain activities
surreptitiously which are not readily detectable and could be danger-
ous. This is particularly true if the super-bomb becomes a real
possibility.
  It would be my recommendation that the United States make a
complete assessment of the role of atomic weapons in the cold war
and in a possible hot war. We should, at the same time, reexamine all
possibilities of bringing the iSoviet Union into the community of
nations. If any useful course of action is indicated by -the above studies,
we could then make an approach to the Soviet Union oon the broader
basis, into which international control would fit.
  Pending the results of such studies we should use the existing forum
of the permanent members of the UNAEC as the point of contact with
the Soviet Union. In the closed, informal sessions of that body -we can,
without undue risk, put forward desirable or appropriate explanations,
suggestions, or even modifications on such matters as the veto and
stages. This forum also provides a point of contact for the necessary
consultations with our allies and for detecting or exploiting any
changes in the Soviet attitude.


Policy Planning Staff Files1
Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) to the
                        Counselor (Kennan)
TOP SECRET                          [WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1950.
Subject: Draft Paper on International Control of Atomic Energy 2
  Following are my comments on the attached atomic energy paper.
I apologize for the broad degree of concurrence because I believe that
you need specific criticism rather than specific concurrence at this
juncture.

  "Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department
of State,
1947-1953.
  2The draft paper does not accompany the source text and has not been spe-
cifically identified. However, the paper in its final form (January 20) appears
on p. 22.


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