NATIONAL -SECURITY POLICY


worried that their politioal f te might ,be determined adversely if they
pressed the subject of economic aid too far.
  Needless to say, the Secretary took violent opposition to all of the
observations of the first three named Senators and pleaded with them
to give serious mental reflection on their attitudes and try to bring
their thinking around to his own .views that Russia does not want war
and that all of ouir energies must be directed toward supplying the nec-
essary funds to do the many things now in process of doing dedicated
to winning the cold war. The Secretary was very fervent in the es-
pousal of his views and told the Senators that if the attitudes that they
had expressed should develop into policies, that as far as he was con-
cerned he would never want to remain Secretary of State.
  As -the conversation closed the writer asked two of the Senators tlhat
had expressed these disturbing thoughts if they honestly believed-that,
even admitting for the sake of the argument that we should endeavor
to espouse such la policy, that the American people would be ,willing to
declare , war without any overt action on the part of Russia, and I was
greeted with the retort that they both felt strongly that as far as t heir
own constituency were concerned, that they would back any .such move
to the hilt.
                                                  JACK 1 K. MCFALL

                          Editorial Note
  On January 26, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted a memo-
randum to the Secretary of Defense in which they set forth "Military
Objectives in Military Aid Programs." For text, see United States
Department of Defense, United States-,Vietnam   Relations, 1945-
1967, 12 volumes (Washington:-Government Printing Office, 1971),
Book 8, pages 273-275.

Policy Planning Staff Files 1
              The President to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET                          WASHINGTON, January 31, 1950.
  My DEAR MR. SECRETARY: After consideration of the report by the
Special Committee of the National Security Council consisting of the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission, designated to advise me on the problem
of the development of a thermonuclear weapon, I hereby direct the

  Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State
1947-1953.
  2 For the report, January 31, and other doeumeuitation on the question
of devel-
oping the hydrogen bomb, see pp. 493 if.


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