FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


dence of any significant reversion to the pre-war belief that America
could escape a leading role in international affairs.
  2. The American people are prepared for a period of protracted
tension in East-West relations; yet they desire their government to
take every initiative which offers a possibility of relieving the mount-
ing tension.
  3. Reaction to recent statements by the President and Secretary of
State shows that there is a powerful segment of American opinion
which feels it is futile to expect dependable agreements with Russia
at this time. Nevertheless, the proposals of !Senator McMahon and
other public figures have given strong impetus to a widespread desire
for the U.S. to try "new approaches" and to express more vigorously
America's objectives for peace-at least "for the sake of the record".
  4. The overwhelming majority of Americans believe that the United
States must continue its efforts to stop Communist expansion, since
such expansion tends to make war more likely and effective defense
more difficult.
  5. Most Americans are willing to consider a wide range of possible
measures to halt Communist expansion; but few would go so far as
to support a "preventive" war.
  6. However, a notable segment of American leaders would be con-
cerned lest stronger measures against Communist expansion should
over-extend our resources or should be unduly provocative to Russia.
B. Factors in Acceptance
  1. Public acceptance of any given proposal depends upon the degree
to which the public is convinced that the situation actually requires
U.S. aiction.
  2. Public acceptance will largely depend upon two further factors
in public opinion: a) the amount of personal sacrifice entailed; and
b) the extent to which U.S. security is thought to be involved-often
measured in terms of geographical propinquity or of historical
association.
  3. Public-acceptance, in addition, depends on the evidence the public
sees that the measures will be reasonably efective in accomplishing
their purpose. For example, the Marshall Plan has been strongly
supported since 1947 because the preponderance of the evidence indi-
cated that the Plan would work and wasworking. On the other hand,
the military assistance program has to date been accepted less widely
and less enthusiastically-partly because the public has not been con-
vinced that theprogram offers an effective solution to the North
Atlantic security problem.
  4. Some public resistance to the idea that new burdens are required
may result from: a) the cumulative effect of earlier sacrifices; b) the


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