NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


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willingness fully to participate in this undertaking. They must partici-
pate to such a degree that every sacrifice we make will be matched by
them ,and that this will be a great cooperative undertaking of'the
principal countries of the free world. If, contrary to my expectations,
our principal allies should not be Wrilling to assume the risks and make
sacrifices involved in this undertaking, we should say to them that we
will have to reexamine our position in relation tothem in the light of
this new situation created by their refusal to do the things which we
think ,are necessary to preser-ve the free world.
   2. Report' .to the, President (Page 24) sets-forth.the outline of a
 comprehensive program to winý the peace and frusrate the Kremlin
 design. The first point of this is "The development: ofran adequate
 political and economic framework for the achievement of our long"
 range objectives." If the recommendationsdn the report are approved
 and we embark upon the program it contemplates, in my opinion we
 will have to spell out this first point in the program nin simple, clear,
 understand-,ble terms that will capture the imagination of our people
 and make them willing to assume additional burdens which will be
 involved. It will not be suffioient to talk merely of strengthening the
 United Nations. I think we can build up such a program around the
 United Nations but itt will have to be bold and dramatic. We.must
 recognize frankly that our people want a collective system of security
 which w ill actually -work. I think our people will be willing to face
 the oextra burdens if the facts are clearly laid beforethem, It will help
 if the program presented to them shows some light at the ýend oftheý
 tunnel. For this reason, we should.make our program-as concrete and
 as definite as we can. I shall at the appropriate time make:specific
 recommendations on this aspect of the program.
 3. OnPage 8of the report to the President, it is suggested that if
 a decision and a start is made on the program, it might be desirable
 for the United Sta'tes to "!take the initiative in seeking negotia'tions
 with the U.S.S.R. in ,the hope ýthat it might -facilitate the, process
of
 accommodation by the Kremlin -to the new situation.-" Isee several
 advantages in this but it seems to me on balance that the dangers
 outweigh the advantages. If this were done, surely the U.S.S.R. would
follow its usual tactics of making a response that would sufficiently
"fuzz up" the situation as to cause differences between us and
our allies
and dissension at home. Could not the same purpose be served with
less risk by a major speech of the President setting forth publicly:our
willingness to negotiate land the t.ermswhich would be acceptable to us?
                                              JOHiN'D. HicKE-RsoN