FOREIGNi-tRELATIONS, 1950, VO LUME I


   Mr. Lay asked whether the most likely next steps'might be Chinese
.Communist involvement, either by an attack on Formosa and nearby
islands, or by the introduction of forces into North Korea. Mr. Lay
said that if Chinese Communists in uniform moved into North Korea,
we would be in a better position to conduct military operations north
of the 38th parallel.... Mr., Kennan agreed. He-said that if we caught
Chinese Communists in.South Korea we could go north of the 38th
parallel and even bomb in-Manchuria. He said we would take the
position that we would not recognize any Chinese Communist declara-
tion of war against us, but if they interfered with our mission in
Korea we would take any necessary action. In other words, we would
ignore their words but not their deeds. Mr. Lay wondered whether
we should say this to the Chinese Communists. Mr. Kennan thought
this question should be considered further.
   General Lindsay warned that if we bombed in Manchuria with con-
ventional bombs we would lose some of our-capability of using atomic
weapons if they later became necessary. He said, however, that it
would be desirable to destroy lines of communication and bases in
North Korea. General Lindsay also indicated the current approach of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was that our operations should be
limited to South Korea in principle, but that General MacArthur
should beieft free to operate north of the 38th parallel if he considered
it necessary to the success of his mission.
  Mr. Lay said it was the consensus of this morning's meeting that
-Yugoslavia was one of the chief danger-spots. Mr. Kennan said he
did not believe that "the USSR would attack Yugoslavia unless the
Soviets became very jittery. Mr. Lay asked whether our actions in
Korea would create jitters in Moscow.: Mr. Kennan thought the4 Rus-
sians were not yet jittery; on the contrary, they were cool and calm,
and somewhat surprised by our reaction in Korea. He thought there
-was no logic indicating a Russian attack on Yugoslavia, except that
if the Russians were planning World War III they might wish to
liquidate Tito first. Admiral Hillenkoetter thought that if the Russians
planned World War III they would attack Germany first and let
Tito sit. Mr. Lay said the question was if the Russians planned to
start war what would they do first? Mr. Kennan said that if Russia
were ready for war they might put satellite forces on the Yugoslav
border to keep Tito quiet. Mr. Gleason asked whether the USSR
would not wait for a quiet period before going after Yugoslavia,.
Mr. Kennan said his preliminary view of our position on Yugoslavia
was that whether satellite or Russian forcess attacked Yugoslavia,

  4 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive issued to General MacArthur on
June 29, 1950, see vol. vii, p. 240.


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