NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


trol of atomic energy would result in a relatively greater disarmament
of the United States than of the Soviet Union, even assuming consider-
able progress in building up the strength of the free world in conven-
tional forces and weapons. It might be accepted by the Soviet Union
as part of a deliberate designa to move against Western Europe and
other areas of strategic importance with conventional forces and
weapons. In this event, the United States would find itself at war,
having previously disarmed itself in its most important weapon, and
would be engaged in a race to redevelop atomic weapons.
  This seems to indicate that for the time being the United States and
other free countries would have to insist on concurrent agreement
on the control of non-atomic forces and weapons and perhaps on the
other elements of a general settlement, notably peace treaties with
Germany, Austria, and Japan and the withdrawal of Soviet influence
from the satellites. If, contrary to our expectations, the Soviet Union
should accept agreements promising effective control of atomic energy
and conventional armaments, without any other changes in Soviet
policies, we would have to consider very carefully whether we could
accept such agreements. It is unlikely that this problem will arise.
  To the extent that the United States and the rest of the free world
succeed in so building up their strength in conventional forces and
weapons that a Soviet attack with similar forces could be thwarted or
held, we will gain increased flexibility and can seek agreements on
the various issues in any order, as they become negotiable.
  In the third place, negotiation will play a part in the building up
of the strength of the free world, apart from the ideological strength
discussed above. This is most evident in the problems of Germany,
Austria and Japan. In the process of building up strength, it may be
desirable for the free natiohs, without the Soviet Union, to conclude
separate arrangements with Japan, Western Germany, and Austria
which would enlist the energies and resources of these countries in
support of the free world. This will be difficult unless it has been
demonstrated by attempted negotiation with the Soviet Union that
the Soviet- Union is not prepared to accept treaties of peace which
would leave these countries free, under adequate safeguards, to par-
ticipate in the United Nations and in regional or broader associations
of states consistent with the United Nations' Charter and providing
security and adequate opportunities for the peaceful development of
their political and economic life.
  This demonstrates the importance, from the point of view of nego-
tiation as well as for its relationship to the building up of the strength
of the free world (see Section D below), of the problem of closer
association-on a regional or a broader basis-among the free
countries.


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