NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


we ought to keep out except for limited assistance to Tito. It was
agreed that this was consistent with present NSC policy.
  Mr. Kennan said if an attack was made on Yugoslavia it would be
necessary for us to brief the press to indicate that our prestige was
not involved by such an attack, Admiral Ilillenkoetter said he had no
evidence that the USSR was prepared to support the North Koreans.
There; appeared to be little Soviet military activity anywhere in the
Far East. 'Mr. Kennan indicated:his belief .that: no new Communist
move was impending in either Indo-China or Burmai.
  Admiral Hillenkoetter said there was no evidence of a Soviet build-
up near Iran except for naval maneuvers in the Caspian Sea. Mr,
Kennan believed Russia would not take.military action in Iran unless
they were ready for World War III, but if the Russians were ready
for World War III they would not start it in Iran.
  Mr. Lanphier said they would start it with'an attack on the LTnited
States. General Lindsay said they 'would attack both Western Europe
and the, U.S., and also possibly Iran. Mr. Kennan said Russiarealizes
she cannot move militarily north of China or west of Afghanistan
except in Finland, without raising the possibility of a world war. lIe
thought the Soviets would not make a military move.unless they were
ready for such a war. He thought the Soviets might take military
action around the periphery rather than directly against the U.S. if
they were ready for a world war, because they believed that "Would
be a better way to start it from the standpoint of propaganda. Gen-
eral Lindsay said the Soviets might take military action on the
periphery in order to force us to make the initial attack. Mr. Kennan
agreed, but thought that in this case the USSR would lose the element
of surprise, and he did not believe they would be willing to give up
the possibility of a- surprise attack. Mr. Kennan said there was little
likelihood of a collapse of the government of Iran in the face of Soviet
pressure.
  Mr. Kennan then turned to the broader question of over-all Soviet
tactics. He said he believed the Russians now intended to exploit the
Asiatic satellites against us until Eastern Germany was built up as a
satellite able to fight the Western European countries.
  In response to a question, Mr. Kennan said Finland was right in the
Soviet orbit already. We would not'want to intervene if the Russians
took over in Finland, nor would we want to do anything to provoke
Russian action in Finland or Sweden. He said we had never challenged
Russia behind the lines drawn as a result of the settlements closing
World War II, but that anything this side of that line engaged our
interests. Finland, however, was behind that line.
  Mr. Lay asked what steps should be taken now in advance of further
Russian moves. Mr. Kennan thought that we might step up military


3,29