NATIONAL SSECURITY POLICY


307


not be able to oppose even by 1960 the Soviet armed forces in war
with any degree of effectiveness." (p. 19')
  2. "At the time the Soviet Union has a substantial atomic stockpile
  [mid-1954] 2 and if it is assumed that it will strike a strong surprise
blow and if it is assumed further that its atomic attacks will be met
with no more effective defense opposition than the United States and
its allies have programmed, results of those attacks could include:
laying waste to the British Isles . . . destruction of the vital centers
and of communications of Western Europe . . . and delivering devas-
tating attacks on certain vital centers of the United States and
Canada." (p. ,204)
   Concerning economic and military potential:
   3. ".   the total economic strength of the U.S.S.R. compares with
that of the U.S. as roughly one to four. . . . Assuming the mainte-
nance of present policies, while a large ,U.S. advantage is likely to
remain,, the Soviet Union will be steadily reducing the discrepancy
between its over-al leconomic strength and that of the U.S. by con-
tinuing to devote proportionately more to capital investment than the
U.S.(p     161    )
  4. "The military budget of the United States represents 6 to 7 per-
cent of its gross national product (as compared with 13.8 percent for
the Soviet Union.). Our North Atlantic Treaty allies devoted 4.8 per-
cent of their national product to military purposes in 1949. This dif-
ference-in emphasis between the two economies means that the
readiness of the free world to support awar effort is tending to decline
relative to that of the Soviet Union." (p. 25 6)
   5. ". ... a full-scale effort by the U.S. would be-capable: of precipi-
tately altering this trend. The U.S.S.R. is on a near maximum pro-
ductlion basis. . . . In the U.S., on the other hand, a very rapid
absolute expansion could be realized. . . . Even Western Europe could
afford to assign a substantially larger proportion of -its resources to
defense, if the necessary foundation in public understanding and will
could be laid, and if the'assistance needed to'meet its dollar deficit were
provided." (pp. 17,125 7)5
   It is, of"course, outside the competence of the Council of-Economic
 Advis~ers toappraise the analysis of military strength prepared by
 the agencieies submfitting NSC 68,.The Council's concern is only that
 the analysis should be in a form most helpful to the work of the Ad
 Hoe Co mmittee.       .
   From this standpoint, it would appear desirable that the data on
 percentage expenditures -on defense and investment which -are used
 in NSC 68 to illustrate probable trends in military, and economic

   Seep.20
   Brackets appear in the source'text.
   *'Omissions throughout the document are indicated in the source text.
   See pp. 251-252.
   See p. 248.
   8 See p. 256.
   7 See pp. 249 and 256.