316            FOREIGN RELATI ONS, -1950,VV0LUME I
poliical- problems tobe1 solved bythe extermination of our' wr alles.

That- was the Russian solution of GeneraltBor's Polish Army.*   .
   Adýmittedly, a-StrongStand at Formosa would involve a slightly
 increased riskýof early war. But sometiles such arisk-has0to-be taken
 in order to preserve peace in the world and to keep the national pres-
 tige: required if we are to play- Our indispensable part in sustaining a
 freeworld.
   Action to be effective must be prompt.


 Policy Planning Staff File.s
      SMemnarandum bytltheNational Seourity Resources Board,

T oP sETm     .                     ..[WASHINGTONJ,]29 May 1950.

                COMM"ENTS.ON-NSC/68 PdILAs.
  Attached is a tabulated :tentative lJst of programs and estimate:
which represent ýa first approximation of what would be heeded to
im-
plement NSC/68, together wit.h comment thereon,.
  NSRB material is isubmtted for consideration of the NSC Sub-
co0mmittee on Programs. It is not completebecause programs and estil.
mates have not yet been submitted by all departments and agencies
concerned,.
   Comment on the programs as a whole and on those programs for
which. the NSRB has primary responsibility is suggested for inclusion
in the Subcommittee report-to the Ad Hoc Comnmittee.

                           Fiscal Year
                    (Figures in millions of dollars)
                1950   1951   195"  1953  1954   1955  1956  1957
State
  Information      50   190   180    240   200    210
  ECA, MDAP     5, 760 5, 400 6,2900 7, 100' .5, 500 4, 700
Defense        13, 700
NSRB
  Civil Defense    0 - 470 1,799 2, 663 3, 608 2, 908 1, 076 2, 130
  Strategic
    Stock-
    piling.
    Expenditure  600 1, 000 1, 500 1, 500  500
    (Obligation) (700)(2, 500)(2, 000) (0)  (0)"

                      PROGRAM ASA HWOLE'
  Based on Ad -Hoc Committee and Subcommittee discussions to date,
and on" the contents and conclusions of the basic paper itself, NSRB
believes that the program implied by-NSC/68 should be one that :
...For plaiming purposes acceptS the premise that by some critical
date, presumably mid-1954 at the latest, the Soviet will be able to
strike the United States a lethal atomic blow;