NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


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by the Defense Establishment and the Department of State to the end
of achieving the highest degree of coordination between war plans
and foreign policy undertakings. The same sort of collaboration as
was realized in producing NSC 68 is essential.
D. External Preparedness Measures
   (1) ,So far as possible, Canada and the United Kingdom should
fully participate in the accelerated program for building strength.
   (2) The United States should not retreat from its commitment
to regard aggression against Western Europe (including Berlin) as
a casus belli. We should be prepared to ,assist our NATO allies in
continental Western Europe to carry out their roles in the Mid-Term
Defense Plan to the extent that such assistance will not interfere with
the accelerated defense programs of the United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom and with the strengthening of other defendable
areas essential to the execution of the strategic plan for war with
the Soviet Union. In light (a) of the official declaration by the Soviet
Union that it will not tolerate the rearming of Western Germany
and (b) of the German reluctance to rearm, we should handle with
the greatest care our efforts to organize and train Western German
military units.
   (3) The United States should take all measures which are nece-s-
sary and possible to prepare such positionsin Europe, Africa, and the
Pacific as can be held in the event of war and as are necessary to the
execution of our strategic plans. We should seek to adjust our positions
in other areas in the light of our capabilities.
   (4) The importance to the United States of maintaining unity with
its allies is now greater than ever. The degree to which other nations
and peoples will be induced to associate themselves and work with
us will depend not only upon the material assistance that we may
be able to provide them but also upon the steadiness, the calmness and
the self-possession that is now shown by the Government and the
people of the United States. Allies can be won and held by responsible
action on the part of the United States. They can be lost by irrespon-
sible talk and erratic national conduct.
E. Political War'fare Measures
   (1) Finally, the United States should develop astrong program of
political warfare, for this will be an important and possibly a decisive
weapon in a war with the Soviet Union. The character, emphasis and
intensity of political and psychological warfare programs and cam-
paigns should continually be intimately linked to our political strategy,
our strategic war plans and our capabilities. As circumstances warrant,
psycholoogical and political warfare campaigns should be undertaken
to undermine the Russian people's loyalty to and support of the