,-NATIONAL ý SE1RItY POLICY2


tory blow, but-would not of itself seem to change the. basiclogic of the
above points. Greatly increased general air, ground and sea strength,
and increased :air defense and civilian defense programs woud also
be necessary.to provide reasonable.assurance that the free world could
survive an initial surprise atomicattack of the weight which it is
estimated theýUbS.S.R. will be capable of deliveringby 1954 and Still
permit the free world to go on to the eventual attainment of its ob-
jectives. Furthermore, such a build-up of strength could.safeguard

.and increaseý our retaliatory power, and thus might-put off for some
time ,the date when the Soviet Union could calculate that a surprise
,,blow would be advantageous. This would provide additional time for
the effects of our policies to produce a modification of the Soviet
system.
   6. If the.U.S.S.R. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the
 U.S., the risks of greatly increased Soviet pressure against all the free
 world, or an attack against the U.S., will be greatly increased.
   7. If the U.S. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the
 U.S.S.R., the U.S. should for the time being be able to bring increased
 pressure on the U.S.S.R.
 B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons.
   1.From ithe-& foregoing analysis it appears that it would be to the
long-te ri advavntage of the United States if atomic weapons were to
be effectively. eliminated 'from national peacetime armaments; the
additional objectives w hih must be secured if there is-to be a reason-
able prospect of such effective elimination of atomic ýweapons are
diScussed in Chapter IX. In the absence of such elimination and the
securing of these objectives, it would appear that we have no alter-
native but to increase our atomic capability as rapidly as other con-
siderations make appropriate. In either case, it appears to be
imperative to Increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground
and sea strength and that of our allies to a point where we are
militarily not so-heavily dependent on atomic weapons.
   2. As is indicated in Chapter IV, it is important that the United
 States- employ military force only if the necessity for its use is clear
 and compelling and commends itself to the overwhelming majority
 of our people. The United States cannot therefore engage in war
 except as a reaction to aggression of so clear and compelling a nature
 as to bring the overwhelming majority of our people to accept the
 use of military force. In the event war comes, our use of force must
 be to compel the acceptance of our objectives and must be congruent
 to the range of tasks which we may encounter.
   In the event of a general war with the U.S.S.R., it must be antici-
 pated that atomic weapons will be used by each side in the manner


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