REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS


scale, if it should prove to be economically feasible. The production of
large stocks of fissionable material by the international agency in
anticipation of possible future uses in atomic power plants therefore
seemed to be unnecessarily dangerous. There resulted ,the provision
which you quoted -from Specific Proposal 12, Chapter 4, of the Second
Report, on keeping the production of weapon-level material to a
minimum. This provision as written land other provisions in the same
chapter would apparently permit work to continue on the development
of atomic p'ower, including the construction of pilot plants, and would
allow power reactors eventually to be constructed by arrangement
between the international agency and the nation concerned. Meanwhile,
in the absence of international control, there has been a large acecumula-
tion of stocks of :welapon-level -issionable material, so that t he limita-
tion of Specific Proposal 12 has to some extent been nullified.
   Various proposals have been made for further limitations on danger-
ous facilities for the production or utilization of fissionable material,
such as a moratorium on atomic power. An important question 'raised
by such proposals is the disposi'tion of the large stocks of fissionable
material now in existence, which are more dangerous in the sense of
the United Nations plan than development or production facilities.
This is also an important Problem in connection with the United
Nations plan itself, and one that has not been vworked out in detail.
Its seriousness continues to increase as more and more fissionable
material is produced.
  The possibility that particle accelerators may be developed for the
production of fissionable material from U-238 and thorium without
being limited by the U-j2'35 content of natural uranium would have
an effect on the p~rospects for 'atomic power by making fissionable
material more readily available for this purpose. The cost of fission-
able material produced in this way would be a factor in deermining
the economics of 'atomic power.
IV, Thermonuclear Weapons
  Since thermonucle-ar weapons 'would be dependent on the avail-
ability of fissionable material and reactors or particle accelerators
for the production of tritium, the United Nations plan in its control
of fissionable material and facilities for its production would 'also be
controlling thermonuclear weapons. This is also in accordance with
the general language .and the definitions of the United Nations 1plan.
If an opportunity presented itself at some fulture time, there are several
places where explicit reference could be made to thermonuelear
weapons and to the light elements. The provisions for the control of
heavy water might also be strengthened. At present, the plan only


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