FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


will use all means available: including Point IV,i3 informational ac-
tivities, diplomatic support, etc.
  Possibly, further areas of Asia may fall into communist hands.
Again, perhaps they won't. No one in this country could guarantee
anything. If they should so fall, this would beserious blow to stability
of area' and to immediate prospects of peoples immediately concerned.
It would constitute definite deterioration of world situation. But it
would not necessarily be fatal or irreparable, from our standpoint, and
no cause either for despair or lack of self-confidence on our part.
World realities have greater tolerances -han we commonly suppose
against ambitious schemes for world dominion. Attempt to maintain
rule over vast areas and populations of Asia would be no easy thing
for Russians and would probably eventually involve them beyond
their own depth.
   Situation in China   still unclear in this respect. Still is no assur-
ance that communist rule in that country and Chinese-Soviet relations
will not both be stabilized for years to come along lines unfavorable
to us. But Chinese communist leaders are now beginning to come up
against real difficulties, both in domestic problems and in arranging
their relations to Kremlin in manner acceptable to elements among
their followers whose continued support is essential to them. It would
be wrong to jump to any foregone conclusions about outcome of con-
tradictions in which Chinese communists have now involved them-
selves through their precipitate assumption of full responsibility in
an area plagued with staggering social problems and-dilemmas.
  We have, of course, immediate problem of recognition. This is less
important than one would think from press furor. Really important
developments in China will not be much affected by whether we recog-
nize or don't recognize; nor is there any compelling need for uni-
formity in timing, as among western powers. Everyone has his own
particular problems. We will be gUided by sum total of pertinent fac-
tors, including state of our public opinion, results of congressional
consultations, prospects for acceptable treatment of our representa-
tives, etc.
   We will not assure any benefits to ourselves just by recognition; it
 will be a question of how we handle ourselves once relations exist.
 But we will also not gain anything by withholding recognition for
 sentimental reasons alone, if realistic considerations indicate desir-
 ability of maintenance of diplomatic contact.
 13For documentation on the Point IV program of economic and -technical assist-
 ance to underdeveloped countries, see pp. 846 ff.
 For documentation on United States policy with respect to -hinia and Taiwan,
 see vol. wV, pp. 256 ff.


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