NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


time, and scope of programs required to attain the objectives outlined
in NSC 68. The aggression by the Chinese Communists in North
Korea has created a new crisis and a situtation of great danger. Our
miltiary build-up must be rapid because the period of greatest danger
is directly before us. A greatly increased scale 'and tempo of effort
is required to enable us to overcome our present military inadequacy.
  2. It must be emphasized that the programs and estimated costs in
the tabulation in Appendix A of NSC 68/3 are not final. In the criti-
cal, complex, and rapidly changing international situation, it is im-
possible to blueprint the specific steps land the costs involved. It is
our intention to keep this problem, now so greatly laccentulated, under
continuous scrutiny. The principial value of these first estimiates is
that they furnish a starting point for the major effort essential to our
national security land to our national objectives.
  3. The several programs hereinafter briefly described* are all con-
ceived to be mutulally dependent. In accordance with the underlying
concept of NSC 68, they represent 'an effort to achieve, under the shield
of 'a military build-up, an integrated political, economic, and psycho-
logical offensive designed to counter -the current threat to the national
security posed by the Soviet Union.
                       THE 31ILITARY PROGRAM
  4. Present conditions make unacceptable the delay involved in the
phasing of our military build-up over a four-year period. It is evident
that the forces envisaged earlier for 1954 must be provided as an
interim program as rapidly as practicable 'and with a target date no
later than June 30, 1952. We must also proceed ,at once to estiablish
a production and mobilization base that will permit a very rapid
expasion to full mobilization. Such a course is essential in order for
us to build rapidly a military strength capable of fulfilling our two
fundamental obligations: (a) Protection against disaster; and (b)
Supporto-f our foreign policy.
  5. The estimates of forces herein which constituted our initial
interim goal were based on the assumption that hostilities in Korea
would terminate in FY 1951. If this assumption proves invalid, or if
the general world situation continues to worsen, these force levels will
have to be increased.
  6. In arriving at these estimates of forces, with full consideration
of the objectives of NSC 68, the following basic tasks were envisaged:
  a. To provide a reasonable initial defense of the Western Hemis-
phere and essential allied areas, particularly in Europe.
  *These programs are described In greater detail in the Annexes to NSC 68/3.
[Footnote in the source text.]
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