1~~lAýTJON OF AUMAM-EEN~'T2


tlhe thorny ,problems of oin#tro which production of nuclear fuels for
peaceful purploses would involve. In a few years, this situation may
lhave a different aspect. In the second place, he international political
ituation could hardly be less favorable than it is today for the nego-
tiation of any exýtensive international agreements of a permanent
na.
ture. Our policy must be based upon the knQwledge that change is the
essence of human affairs and upon the hope that change will affect
this situation 'favorably over the course of some years. If so, the future
would presumably be a better time to, try to arrive a Permanent
arrangements for international control of atomic, energy thanis the
present.¶
  I must urther qiestion whether our non-comittal attitude on the
matter of stages-r-ý-an attitude developed during the period When
we
considered ourselves the sole custodians of the secrets and know-how
of bomb production-is wholly justified in a period whenthat premise
has been:demonstrated no longer valid.
  Surely, as things stand today, there can be little ground for concern
about the particular stage aft which our atomic secrets should be re-
vealed to other nations in th establishment of any plan of control.
It may be a*sked, therefore, whether it is' really true today, as the
Atomic Energy Commision stated in its Third Report to the Security
Council, that "'until agreenent on the basic principles of conrol has
been reached, the elaboration of proposals to cover  A.. the subject
of stages "     would-be unrealistic and would serve no useful pur--
poses ... " ** It does seem that there should be some way in which.
the Russians could be given unequivocal assurance in the preliminary
phaose of negotiations that ,effective prohibition of the weapon and
closing down of nuclear fuel producig plants in all countries, includ-
ing our, own, would take place concurrently with, or at least not sub-
sequent to, the establishment of a strict@ control over raw materials.
  A question further exists as to our position on the disposal of stoeks
of nuieear fuel. Itý should be no:t-ed that if large reactos were
to be
abolished, strategic advantage in atomic weapons would depend largely

  ¶ The concept, of a temporary rather than a permanent agreement is
Vot a
new one. In the discussion of the control piroblem by W. T. R, 'ox, in tie
volume
The Atomic Weapon (Harcourt, Rrace and Co.,, New Yo:k,19,46) which was one
of the first comprehensive private treatiae onthis probiem, contained. the
following Passage:
  "7op priorityb must today be given to the transitional problem of
keeping the
future open until men can make the fundamental adaptation neessary to
civilizedlife in t4e atomi-c erm. it cannot he to9 strongly reiterated tht4
'per-
manent' solnutins, which risk atomic warnoaw in order. to.have permanent
peaee
later are no solutiols'."[liOtute in the soUrCe textI]
  ** Third Report of the UNAEO"to the Security Council, May 17, 1948,
Part
] (State DOepartment PUb!ti-on 3170, p. 3)., [FootnQote in the sourcete.xt.]


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