NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


                V. SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES
  A. Political and Psychological
    The Kremlin's design for world domination begins at home. The
 first concern of a despotic oligarchy is that the local base of its power
 and authority be secure. The massive fact of the iron curtain isolating
 the Soviet peoples from the outside world, the repeated political
 purges within the U.S.S.R. and the institutionalized crimes of the
 MVD are evidence that the Kremlin does not feel secure at home and
 that "the entire coercive force of the socialist state" is more
than ever
 one of seeking to impose its absolute authority over "the economy,
 manner of life, and consciousness of people" (Vyshinski, "The
Law of
 the Soviet State", p. 74). Similar evidence in the satellit6 states
of
 Eastern Europe leads to the conclusion that this same policy, in less
 advanced phases, is being applied to the Kremlin's colonial areas.
   Being a totalitarian dictatorship, the Kremlin's objectives in these
 policies, is the total subjective submission of the peoples now under its
 control. The concentration camp is the prototype of the society which
 these policies are designed to achieve, a society in which the personality
 of the individual is so broken and perverted that he participates
 affirmatively in his own degradation.
   The Kremlin's policy toward areas not under its control is the elimi-
 nation of resistance to its will and the extension of its influence and
 control. It is driven to follow this policy because it cannot, for the
 reasons set forth in Chapter IV, tolerate the existence of free societies;
 to the Kremlin the most mild and inoffensive free society is an affront,
 a challenge and a subversive influence. Given the nature of the Krem-
 lin, and the evidence at hand, it seems clear that the ends toward which
 this policy is directed are the same as those ,where its control has
 already been established.
   The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy are
limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is not a limit-
ing factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence, subversion
and deceit, and rejects moral considerations. In any event, the
Kremlin's conviction of its ,own infallibility has made its devotion to
theory so subjective that past or present pronouncements as to doctrine
offer no reliable guide to future actions. The only apparent restraints
on res~ort to war are, therefore, calculations of practicality..-
  With particular reference to the United States, the Kremlin's stra-
tegic and tactical policy is affected by its estimate that we are not only
the greatest immediate obstacle which stands between it and world
domination, we are also the only power which could release forces in
the ifree and Soviet worlds which could destroy it. .The Kremlin's
policy toward us is consequently animated by a peculiarly virulent

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