NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


  Although such developments as .those indicated in paragraph 18
above would severely weaken the capability of the United States and
its allies to, cope with the Soviet threat to their security, considerable
progress has been made since 1948 in laying the foundation upon which
adequate strength can now be rapidly built.
  The Analysis also confirms that our objectives with respect to the
Soviet Union, in time of peace as well as in time of Var,'as stated in
NSC 20/4 (para. 19), are still valid, as are the aims and. measures
stated therein (paras. 20 and 21). Ourcurrent securityprograms and
strategic plans are based upon these objectives, aims, and measures:
  "19.
      "a. To reduce the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to limits
    which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national inde-
    pendence and stability of the world family of nations.
      "b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of interna-
    tional relations by the government in power in Russia, to
    conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the U.N.
    Chart er."
  "In pursuing6a these'objectives, due care must be taken' to'avoid
permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and"
institutions inherent in our way of life..
  "20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by
methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims:
      "a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of .undue
    Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas
    around traditional Russian boundaries and the em-ergence of the
    satellite countries as entities independent of the U.S.S- .R.
      "64 To, encourage the development among thl Russian peoples
    of .attitudes whiCh may help to modify current Soviet-:behavior
    and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing-the
    ability .and I determination to achieve and-maintain national
    indep'endence6,,
      "c. To eradicate the my th by which people sremote fromSoViet
      military influenceareheld in a position of subservience, to Mscow
    and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true
    nature of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet-directed world communist
    party, and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them.
      "d. To create situations which will compel the Soviet Govern-
    ment to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the
    basis of0its" present concepts and-the necessity of" behaving
in
    accordance with precepts of international conduct, ;:aas set forth:.
in
    the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter.
 "21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United Stat:
     a .. eeop.ii -
     "a DevelOp I a level of miltary readiness which' can be main-'
     tained as 1ong as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as
     indispensable support to our political attitude 'tow0ard the
     U.S.S.R., as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet
     political aggression, and as an adlequate basis for immediate mili-


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