FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


quire the employment of other forces to maintain the present com-
munist regime.
  17. The use of the East German para-military forces against allied
troops in Germany is another possibility. It is doubtful that this
force would undertake a direct attack on any of the western zones.
Such an attack could not easily be undertaken without directly in-
volving the Soviet Union. If all or a large part of this force were
sent into the western sectors of Berlin it might overcome the small
forces of the western powers there. Such overt action by the East
German police force would again be difficult without directly involv-
ing the Soviet military authorities. The East German forces might
be useful to the Soviet Union in connection with a blockade of Berlin.
  18. Further use of the Chinese communists, including the employ-
ment of organized Chinese communist forces against South Korea
and Southeast Asia, is a strong possibility. They are the only satellite
forces in Asia which could commit major acts of aggression. The
Chinese communists are anxious to control Formosa (including the
Pescadores) and have announced their determination to do so regard-
less of U.S. decisions or actions. While an early attack on Formosa
is a continuing possibility, its success would be doubtful unless ac-
companied by a collapse of the Nationalist forces and regime. The
United States is proceeding with steps designed to enhance the defen-
sive capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists (NS1C 37/10).9
  19. Chinese communist attacks on the islands near China held by
the Nationalists can be expected to continue.
  20. Chinese communists, in addition to an attack on Formosa, have
the military capability to enter directly the Korean war and to
initiate military action against Indochina or Burma or Tibet. Any
or all of these actions are possible. A move against Tibet may be
expected.
  21. Chinese communists have the military capability to capture
Macao and Hong Kong. Civil disorder, subversion, and sabotage,
appear to be the more likely actions, particularly in Hong Kong, since
these could in all probability eventually achieve the objective with-
out military involvement.
  22. The capabilities of the Chinese communists outlined above
contribute to the over-all capabilities of the US'SR since any major
military success by these forces in the Far East, with the consequent
political results, adds security to the Soviet eastern flank and lessens

  'For text of NSC 37/10, "Immediate U.S. Courses of Action with Respect
to
Formosa," a statement prepared by the Secretaries of State and Defense
based
on recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 3, see vol. vI, p.
413.


382