ATOMIC ENERGY


knowledge of its positive effects, we shall be unable to counter possible
enemy exploitation of the frightening and paralyzing fiction which
has become associated from time to time with thermonuclear explo-
sions. Accordingly, it must be anticipated that the development of a
thermonuclear weapon by the USSR in advance of the United States,
particularly if the announcement follows secret development, would
have a demoralizing effect on the American people. It would have
psychological and political repercussions which might raise a question
concerning the continued unity of spirit, confidence and determination
among the nations of the western world. The situation today is
strikingly parallel to that of a few years ago when this nation was
engaged in a race to develop a fission bomb before Germany. From
the Soviet point of view, sole possession of the thermonuclear weapon
would place in their hands an offensive weapon of the greatest known
power possibilities. It would provide the Soviet leaders, people and
satellites with a psychological boost which in peacetime could lead to
increased truculence in international affairs and increased political
infiltration in nations of the western world. The "blackmail" potential
,of the thermonuclear weapon would serve the USSR well in its aims
to impose its will upon the nations of Europe and to alienate these
nations from the Western camp. In time of war, sole possession of the
thermonuclear weapon and possession of fission weapons coupled with
superiority of conventional military forces would provide the Soviets
with the necessary balance to current Western unity and to our
superior fission weapon stockpile to enable them to risk hostilities for
the rapid achievement of their objectives. The above developments
cannot be forecast with certainty; however, the materialization of one
or more of these possible developments could have such an unaccept-
able effect upon our world position as to force a complete re-evaluation
of our strategic plans and of our national objectives in peace and in
war. It is concluded that possession of a thermonuclear weapon by
the USSR without such possession by the United States would con-
stitute a situation fraught with danger to the United States, and must
be avoided.
   b. Hypothesis: Sole Possession by the United States. The sole pos-
session of this weapon by the United States would cause all of the
practical and many of the psychological advantages of possession of
thermonuclear weapons to accrue to our side, land may act as a deter-
rent to war. From the practical point of view, possession of this
weapon would add materially to the striking power of our forces
against those important tactical and strategic objectives which are
particularly ada pted to a thermonuclear weapon. For example, large
concentrations of enemy troops and materiel, such as occur frequently
in war (the Normandy invasion, the defense of Stalingrad, the Bulge
break-through, large dumps, singularly important airplane concen-
trations, and other such large but lucrative targets) which would now
require multiple delivery of fission weapons, could be destroyed or
critically disrupted with a single thermonuclear weapon. Since this
destruction could be applied throughout the target area with simul-
taneity, the value of surprise could be exploited to the maximum.
Effective destruction of the above target types may well lead to de-
cisive results since such concentrations normally occur in connection
with critical operations in war. Moreover, attack of enemy atomic air


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