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economic, etc. It was the consensus of opinion that NSC 6-8:had em-
phasized the inseparability of the mnilitary build-up from other weap-
ons of the cold war, and that the one without the other would fail to
achieve the objectives of the United States. There was also general
agreement on the'serious risks of war involved in proceeding-with1
more aggressive political, economic, and psychological measures in the
absence of any adequate military shield.
  This led to a discussion of what constituted an "adequate" military
build,-up, and whether the present military strength of the United-
States was sufficient to enable us to fulifill our commitfiments and tok
achieve our objectives. JCS opinion having been cited,-it was the!
general understanding of the Committee that NSC 68 offered no0hope"
of reaching U.S. objectives or fulfilling-U.S. commitments Under
current plans 'and programs.
  The question was then raised as to precisely what NSC 68 was pre,-
paring for; whether full mobilizations'for war by 1954, or something
less. After discussion it was generally agreed that NSC 68 did not call
for complete preparation for war, but primarily for a posture of
defense sufficient to enable the U.S. to deter a direct Soviet ýattack,
and to achieve ultimate U.S. objectives short of war. It was further
agreed, however, that the full implications of the Conclusions of NSC
68 would have to await the formulation of programs and estimates.
  Thereupon discussion centered on the comments of the Bureau of
the Budget as to the relative strength of the U.S. and the USSR atý
the present time, and of the relative claims of national security and
considerations of economy on the resources of the Nation. Emphasis
was laid upon the importance of effective and realistic programming
if the necessary balance was to'be secured.
   In comment upon the response to be made to the President's letter
on NSC 68, it was pointed out that simply to send outlines of programs
and estimates of costs for them was insufficient. An adequate response
also required a clear statement of the means by which the plans and
dollars were designed to achieve our objectives and safeguard our
national security.
  After further discussion of the response to the President's letter,
there was general agreement that any remaining doubts as to the valid-
ity of the facts underlying the Conclusions of NSC 68 should be
resolved by direct discussion between the interested agencies. It was
also agreed that the sub-committee on programs would meet on Mon-
day, May 15, 1950, before which time the Committee members from
the several departments and agencies would notify the Executive
Secretary of the names of their representatives.
                                               JAMES S. LAY, JR.


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