FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


precipitation of the wastage of Soviet resources to the advantage of-the
West-an a manner in reverse of that which obtains to the situation in
Korea. It is therefore our conclusion that it is unlikely, if the above
analysis of Soviet intentions is correct, that Yugoslavia will actually
be attacked. Again, it is probable that the movem ts of military fores
in the vicinity are occasioned, by any one or all of the.Afollwing pur-
poses: intimidation, deception, or deaire to b able to neutralize Tito in
the event that a world -war should ensue by inadvertence in the near
future.
   Should the Kremlin, contrary to our estimate, actually launch an
attack on Yugoslavia with its own or satellite forces or both, this
Government should follow its existing policy:determinations with
respect to this contingency: i.e., it should not enter into such a war
4irectly but should support-Tito to the extent possible by supplying
arms and other forms of indirect assistance as well as particiipating-
in appropriate UN action. In this event, however, we would have to
revise entirely our estimate of Soviet intentions and make a new
search for the motives of such an attack. As of today, no such motives
are apparent.
  With respect to Germany-and Austria, if the Kremlin does not want
war, it will not make moves with Soviet forces at those points which
it thinks will bring on war; but it will of course go as far as it believes
it can go without producing this result.
  b. The second of these points, namely the effort to embarrass us
in every conceivable way through operations of Communist parties
and stooge groups abroad, may not produce, in many'areas, any par-
ticular change in the existing military situation, for the reason that
the existing possibilities are already being exploited. However, in-
tensified lCommunist subversive or revolutionary activity might fully
engage local military resources in Southeast Asia and even in Hong
Kong. The main possibilities under this heading lie in the use of the
forces of Communist ýChina,.the only Soviet satellite, in addition
to
North Korea, which is today in a suitable position to be successfully
exploited against us. These possibilities which may be subject to rapid
alteration in the light of developments in the Korean situation are:
       (1), The introduction of Chinese Communist forces into the
     Korean conflict. While this is a matter for operational decision,
     it is our assumption that we would not hesitate to oppose any
     Chinese Communist forces which might engage themselves against
     us in the Korean theater, or any 'movement of such forces to the
     Korean theater. If they.should become engaged in the theater we
     would have adequate grounds for air and sea attacks on targets in
     Communist China directly related to the enemy effort in Korea.
     Whether we would wish to take such action would be a matter
     :for consideration in the light of circumstances prevailing at the
     time. An entry of Chinese Communist forces into the Korean
     theater would indicate a significant widening of the Korean con-
     flict in the military sense and should be the occasion for a careful
     review, and possible revision, of our concept as to our military
     mission in Korea, and the over-all implications of our involve-
     ment there.


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