FOREIGN -RELATIONS, 1,95:0, 4" VOLUME I


decide. t:oh old weapons -of mass destruction,,only for deterrent-
retaliatory-purposes, then the limit on theo number and power of the
weapons we should hold is: governed by our estimate as to what it
would take to make attack on this country or its allies by. weapons of
mass destruction a risky, probably unprofitAble, and therefore irra-
tional undertaking for any, adversary. In these circumstances, the
problem of whether to develop the superbomb: and other weapons of
mass. destruction becomes, only a question of the: extent to which they
would 'be needed to 'achieve this purpose. It might be, for example,'that
theppresent and -prospective stockpile of conventional bombs, combined
with-present and prospective possibilities for delivery, would be found
adequate to this purpose 'and that 'anything furtherin thevway of mass
destruction weapons would ,be redundan t, .or would fall into -an area
of diminishing. returns.t    .
  If, on the other hand, we are resolved to use weapons of mass de-
struction deliberately and prior to their use against us or our allies,
in a future war, then our purpose is presumably to inflict maximum
destruction on the forces, population and territory of the enemy, with
the least expenditure of effort, in full acceptance of the attendant risk
of retaliation against us, and in the face of all moral and political
considerations. In this-case; the only limitations on the number and
power of mass destruction weapons which we would wish to develop
would presumably be those of ordinary military economy, such as
cost, efficiency, and, ease odf'delivery.
  'Depending, therefore, on 'which of these courses is selected, our
decision on the superbomb might be one of two diametrically opposite
ones.
  It is unnecessary to dwell on the significance of this decision from
the standpoint of our military."planning in the field of conventional
weapons. Obviously, if we make our use of weapons of massdestruc-
tion dependent on their prior use against us or our allies, we subject
ourselves to the possibility that they may not be used at all, and we
then have tobe prepared to accept combat with conventional weapons.
This affects not only -the compositionof our armed establishment but
-also the concept which we, may entertain of our nobjectives in the event
of a future war with the U.S.S.R. For what could conceivably be
achieved militarily 'and politically without atomic weapons, 'whether
something better or something worse, is presumably at least different

  t Note that the Soviets claim that their aim in developing the bomb is
only
to have "enough" for purposes of retaliation. Yyshinski, in his-speech
before
the U.N. Assembly on November 10, 1949, said: "We in the Soviet Union
are
utilizing atomic energy, but not in order to stockpile atomic bombs-although
I am convinced that if, unfortunately and to our great. regret, this were
neces-
sary, we should have as many of these as we need-no more and no less."
[Footnote in the source text. GA (IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, p. 188.1


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