REGULATION ,OF ARMAMENTS


  flense, and, the Aomic Energy Comnission, are, representd,6he con-
  cernsedviewsofn the Athreei exerug tive ssagenies most retedl  cerned
  are odtvined on fnternaeional control policy  m d
    S ince ugust 9, 1949, i have represented theUnited States in the
 iconsulgtions ofthe six h permanent members ofthe United Nations
 Atomn  ioEnergy oCmmissionx p Theaen mwerecalled for in fhetGeneral

 Assembly resolution, passed in Paris in 1948 in order to determine
 whether a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic
 energy could bhe found. As a member of the United States Delegation
 to the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations last fall, I
 represented the United States in the, General Assemibly considera-
 htion and debate on atomic energy and on conventional armaments.
   When I took this assignment, I needed an aanswer f rom the te-hnical
 people as to whether it is or iis not possible technically -to control atomic
 energy to ensure, that it is used only for ,peaceful purposes, so that
 the prohibition of all types of atomicý weapons could be made really
 effective. Their answer was yes
   This question has been repeatedly answered in the affirmative. It was
 first answered by the Board of Consultnts appointed to the Depart-
 ment of State in early 1946, when that Board, known as the Acheson-
 Lilienthal Board, fir st reported .that control of atomic energy was
 feasible and indicated the lines along which such control could be
 achieved.,
   It was answered again by the Scientific and Teclhnical Committee of
 the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission when that committee
 reported unanimously in ,Se.ptember 1946 that ",we do not ,find any
 basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control
 is not technologically feasible." 12
   Many times since, we have had this question looked into not only
 by the AEC, but by scientific and technical consultants as well, and the
 answer has always been the same,
 'The recent announcement regarding the hydrogen bomb, of course,
 immediately raised the question of whetther the U.N. plan of control
 would be fully adequate to cover the hydrogen bomb. The.answer has
 been that it, would.
 While we are in constant .touch with lthe AEC and the Department
 of Defense on this subject, we ,thought that it 'would be useful to get
 from the AEC a comprehensive current evaluation as to whether any
 other -:technical developments have occurred, or are likely to:occur,
-in the United! States or abroad which would require a change or a

  2'For the text of the report adopted by the Scientific and Technical Committee
on September 26, 1946, see United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic
Energy
Commission,-First Year, Special Supplement, Report to the Security Council
(1946), (hereafter cited as AEC, 1st yr., Special Suppl.), Part IV.
     496-362 77 --6


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