NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


to be done in FY 1951, i.e., what supplemental appropriation is to be
requested from the Congress.2
   a. Fortunately, this does not appear to present a serious problem.
 The only controversial item is a reduction of $1.5 billion. The re-
 mainder of the' reduction has been made because expenditures for the
 Korean war have not been as 'high as was expected and because of a
 bottle-neck in aircraft engines which limits aircraft procurement. The
 $1.5 billion seems to represent a real reduction in the war reserve of
 the Army.
   b. The essential need is a prompt decision, in order that FY 1951
 program as ,a whole can be pushed rapidly ahead. The Army feels that
 they might lose more by holding Up the whole program than would
 Tbe galined by deferring a decision in order to give more consideration
 to this one item of reduction,
   .. Therefore, it seems wise for the Council to recommend to the
'President -whatever figure is most acceptable to the Department of
Defense for the supplemental appropriation for FY 1951. LThis pre-
sumably means a figure of the order of magnitude of $45 billion, as
compared with the September 1 figure of approximately $54 billion.
  2. With respect to FY 1952 and succeeding years, it is necessary to
  make a decision by December 15, the deadline set by the President.
  The problem is how to.move forwardtosuch adecision.
  a. The first question is what is the recommendation of the Secretary
of Defehse?, The papers which have been submitted do not make clear
what is being recommended by whom, and what is the basis of the
recommendation. It was stated at the Senior Staff that the JCS
regard themselves as responsible for force and equipment requirements,
but not for the supporting budgetary estimates, which, in their opinion,
are the responsibility of the Secretaryv ofý Defense.
   b. With respect to the size- of the forces to be built up, it seems
,doubtful whether either the September 1 plan or the current revision
provides forces which will be adequate to meet our responsibilities for
our own defense, the defense of Western Europe, our UN com-
mitments, and our other responsibilities. This is a basic doubt which
the Department of State holds about all the planning which has been
done to date.
   c. The paper before us states-that what is done in FY 1951 and FY
 1952 will have an important bearing on what can be done later. The
 meaning of this statement is not wholly clear. Does it mean that if
 the plans for FY 1951 and FY 1952 outlined in the Appendices are
 adopted, it will not be possible to build up the forces called for in
 the September 1 plan for FY    1954, if such a build-up becomes
 necessary?
   d. The paper before us states that the current revision is based on
certain non-military considerations, but does not indicate what these
  'Regarding President Truman's request to Congress for additional defense
appropriations, December 1, see the second editorial note, p. 420.


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