FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME X


that plan were accepted now, Hanford 1 would be shut down. At one
time the Soviet Union did not oppose this provision and, in fact,
expressed considerable interest in its corollary, the idea of national
quotas for peaceful uses. Now that it is presumably no longer a have-
not nation, Vishinsky,15 in the last General Assembly stated:
  "The requirements of the Soviet Union of atomic energy for peace-
ful purposes are tremendous, and the attainments of the Soviet Union
in the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful ends are also tre-
mendous. All this must be borne in mind when mention is made of
quotas and rationing ..... " At the same time, however, we insist that
no one must prevent us from utilizing atomic energy to the maximum
extent for peaceful purposes. ....*" He also stated that the U.N. plan
was designed to make impossible the development of atomic energy
for peaceful ends. It seems clear that the Soviet Union would accept
no restriction on its development of atomic energy, i.e., manufacture
of nuclear fuel with all its implications.
  "(d) disposition of stocks of dangerous materials in such a
way as to give reasonable assurance against any one-sided advantage
by seizure."
  This, too, is not new, being an integral part of the U.N. plan. The
Soviet Union has not expressed disapproval of this feature and is not
expected to, so long as it is U.S. stocks that are to be redistributed.
I fail to see how we can seriously put this forward except as part of
the U.N. plan. In -the context of the proposed temporary modus
viiendi, it can only mean an almost immediate equalization of U.S.
and Soviet atomic capabilities, with little to show in return...
  "(e) non-dangerous activities to be left in national hands, but only
on the condition of complete 'openness' of research and development
activity."
  This is provided in the U.N. plan, subject to such licensing and
inspection as are deemed necessary by the nature of the research and
development, and the quantities of nuclear fuel used or produced. The
Soviet Union objects to this, as, in fact, they do to any requirement
for real "openness".
  "(f) No international authority and no veto provisions."
  This is somewhat obscure. If it means no international body, it is
inconsistent with subsequent provisions for U.N. custody and super-
vision over large reactors, nuclear fuel and raw material sources, an
inspection system, periodic observation of non-dangerous activities,
etc. These activities must be carried on by some, presumably a U.N.,
organ. If what is intended is the denial of positive managerial, re-
search, and development functions on the part of the international
agency, it should be emphasized that such functions make control
easier, would attract more competent personnel, and could mean the
difference between success and failure. It might be noted that even the
Soviet proposals take this factor into account and provide for research
by the international agency in its own laboratories.

  "4The plutonium production installation of the U.S. Atomic Energy
Com-
  mission at Hanford, Washington.
  '5 Andrei Y. Yyshinsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union;
  Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the Fourth Session of the General
  Assembly.
  1 6 Omissions indicated in the sovrce text.


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