NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


  Group C-Mr. John H. [E.] Murphy 7
  Group D--Mr. Ralph Hilton8

  7Chief of the Control Staff, Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
  8Information Officer, Mutual Defense Assistance Program.



Memorandum     by the Director of the Office of Eastern European
  Affairs (Yost) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Euro-
  pean Affairs (Thompson)

SECRET                           [WASHINGTON,] February 15, 1950.
  Attached is a paper I have drawn up outlining the approach I believe
we should take in dealing publicly with 'the demand that we negotiate
a general settlement with the Soviets,. The paper is not intended for
use in its present form but to serve ias a basis for a speech by the
Secretary or in other public presentations of the Department's point
of view.
  We are continuing to revise and bring up to date the list of Soviet
treaty violations land this will be coming to you soon. I am inclined to
think, however, that that is too negative a line to serve as the main
theme of our policy on this question. I would prefer to see spelled out,
as I have in the attached ,paper, the manifest impossibility of recon-
ciling by negotiation ;the position we must !assume on the mnain issues
in protection of our vital interests with the position the Soviets have
assumed and will continue to assume until obliged by the facts of life
to lower their sights.
                                                  CHARLES W. YOST

                              [Annex]
Paper Prepared by the Director of the Office of Eastern European
                          Affairs (Yost)

SECRET                           [WASHINGTON,] February 15, 1950.
            BASIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
  In order to determine whether it is worth while to enter into nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union with a view to a general settlement, it
would be useful, first, to list the chief issues outstanding between East
and West which would necessarily be dealt with in such a settlement,
second, to indicate the position of the two parties on each ofý these
issues and, finally, to estimate whether or not there is a reasonable
likelihood of these positions being reconciled. If it appears that such


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