158 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I

The inescapable conclusion of the above catalogue would appear to
be that, on most of the principal issues involved, the Soviets would
not at present make those concessions which would be required to
create a feeling of trust and confidence on our part. On the other hand,
we could not go far toward meeting the Soviet position on these issues
without abandoning either our vital interests or those of our Allies
and friends. There would be no assurance, moreover, that such
abandonment would in fact strengthen peace rather than merely whet-
ting the Soviet appetite for further concessions. |

The question nevertheless arises whether, as urged by a number of
_ public figures here and in Western Europe, we should make one further
effort to arrive at an over-all settlement with the Soviets before
reconciling ourselves to the long and arduous strain of a cold war ever
threatening to become hot. The principal argument for making this
further attempt is not that it would make any real impression on the
Soviets but that it might help to convince waverers in the West that
we have exhausted every possible means of reaching a peaceful solu-
tion. As indicated in the opening paragraphs of this memorandum,
however, a general negotiation which failed to produce a real settle-
ment might well be more dangerous than no negotiation at all. |

If the negotiation broke down, it would accentuate the fear of early
war; 1f the negotiation produced a partial or superficial agreement
which actually failed to settle the chief issues, the effect might be
merely to lull the West into a sense of false security of which the
Soviets could take advantage. If this sense of security should cause
the US to relax its present efforts, the nations of Western Europe
might well feel obliged in their turn to compromise with the Com-
munists. Thus the Soviets, who have more effective means than we of
controlling their allies, could have achieved their objective of isolating
the US.

The fact is that many of the maj or issues between East and West
are being discussed, or can easily be discussed, in existing forums in
the UN or elsewhere. The wisest strategy would appear to be to make
it completely and repeatedly clear that we are ready and willing to
discuss any and all of these issues in the appropriate forums, that we
have presented for the solution of most of these issues workable plans
which have won wide international support, and that it is now up to
the Soviet Union, if it does not feel able to accept these plans, to
present workable alternatives which will also receive general inter-
national support. If, however, it should be deemed necessary to make
some additional gestures to satisfy public opinion, it would be possible
to reintroduce into the appropriate forums our plans modified in such